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III 
ENGLISH SUMMARY 
In this dissertation, I aim to answer the following research question: How are 
opinions, preferences and actions related to women’s conditions and their roles in 
social policy throughout the life course? The focus is on the role of gender and the 
family in social policy throughout life. Based on different stages in the process of 
agency in institutionalist theory, I divide the research question into opinions, 
preferences, actions and outcomes – each the topic of one article – and link them to 
cultural ideas and policies. 
Despite European societies moving away from the male breadwinner model at 
different paces, the results of this dissertation show that the family is still an important 
player in welfare provision for the old on the continent. Women contribute to the 
welfare of their elder parents through informal care, even at the expense of their own 
well-being in certain contexts. Interestingly, cultural norms regarding the role of the 
family in eldercare do not affect women providing informal caregiving, but they do 
determine the amount of care they give and the impact intensive caregiving has on 
their own well-being. In countries where familialist eldercare norms are dominant, 
women are more likely to provide intensive care, yet experience higher well-being in 
doing so. In countries where eldercare is not seen as a family responsibility, the 
opposite is true: caregivers tend to give care to a limited extent, and high-intensity 
caregiving is related to lower well-being. Not only do cultural norms shape the role 
of the family in welfare supply for the old, familialist policies do so as well. In a 
study on the Belgian pension system, built on the male breadwinner model, policies 
can exacerbate the financial dependence of women on their husbands after retirement. 
This happens by denying married women the receipt of their own pension 
entitlements, and women face a high risk of poverty in old age after divorce. 
I also assess the role of culture and policies in shaping individuals’ opinions towards 
state involvement in care and their retirement preferences. Individuals’ actions are 
rooted in their ideas and preferences, which in turn are formed based on cultural 
norms and policies in society. Studies on childcare opinions and retirement 
preferences show that the role of policies and culture goes well beyond setting 
incentive structures, as they shape the individual’s ideas and preferences through 
internalisation processes. Hence, we can conclude that the family as a provider of 
well-being is deeply engrained in both culture and policies, and this affects how 
individuals think about, act upon and experience welfare supply through the family. 
V 
DANSK RESUME 
I denne afhandling besvares følgende spørgsmål: Hvordan er opfattelser, 
præferencer, og handlinger relateret til kvinders betingelser og deres roller i velfærd 
igennem livsforløbet? Fokusset er på rollen af køn og familien i velfærd igennem 
livet. Med udgangspunkt i forskellige stadier i agency processen i institutionalistisk 
teori opdeles spørgsmålet i opfattelser, præferencer, handlinger og udfald – hvert 
emne behandles i hver sin artikel – og forbindes med kulturelle idéer og politikker. 
Selvom de europæiske samfund bevæger sig væk fra den maskuline forsørgermodel 
i forskellige hastigheder, viser resultaterne i denne afhandling at familien fortsat 
spiller en vigtig rolle for de ældres velfærdsydelse på kontinentet. Kvinder bidrager 
til forældrenes velfærd ved at være omsorgsgivere, selvom dette kan skade deres egne 
velbefindende i visse kontekster. Resultaterne viser at kulturelle normer vedrørende 
familiens rolle i ældrepleje ingen effekt har på andelen af kvinder, der giver uformel 
ældreomsorg. Normer vedrørende familiens rolle påvirker dog omsorgens intensitet 
og effekten af det at give omsorg på individets velbefindende. I lande med stærkt 
familieorienterede omsorgsværdier er kvinder mere tilbøjelige til at give intensiv 
omsorg, men de oplever alligevel et højere velbefindende. I lande hvor ældrepleje 
ikke ses som værende et familieansvar gælder det modsatte: Omfanget af omsorg er 
begrænset og en højere grad af omsorg er relateret til lavere velbefindende. Det er 
ikke kun kulturelle normer, der påvirker familiens rolle i velfærden, der ydes til de 
ældre, familieorienterede politikker gør det også. En undersøgelse af det belgiske 
pensionssystem, som er bygget på den maskuline forsørgermodel, viser at politikker 
kan forstærke kvindernes finansielle afhængighed af deres ægtefælle efter 
tilbagetrækning. Dette skyldes at gifte kvinder nægtes individuelle pensions-
rettigheder og at risikoen for fattigdom er høj ved skilsmisse. 
Jeg undersøger også kulturens og politikkers betydning i måden hvorpå de påvirker 
individers opfattelser af hvilken rolle staten bør spille i pleje og i individernes tilbage-
trækningspræferencer. Individers handlinger er forankret i deres idéer og præferen-
cer, som er baseret på kulturelle normer og politikker i samfundet. Undersøgelser af 
holdninger til børnepleje og tilbagetrækningspræferencer viser, at betydningen af 
politikker og kultur går videre end til blot at forme incitamentsstrukturer: de former 
individers idéer og præferencer igennem internaliseringsprocesser. Derfor kan vi kan 
konkludere, at familiens tilvejebringelse af velfærd stadig er forankret i både kultur 
og politikker, og at kultur og politikker påvirker måderne hvorpå individer tænker 
om, handler på, og oplever, velfærd, der ydes af familien. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Welfare states emerged in the golden age of industrial production in the 1950s and 
1960s, where workers were paid family wages sufficient to maintain an entire nuclear 
family on one income. While men were involved in paid work, women typically 
stayed at home to care for the children or dependent elders. Hence, the male bread-
winner model was the cornerstone of society on which the welfare state was built. 
Therefore, welfare states were typically oriented towards the main risk in such a 
society: the loss of income for the breadwinner. To deal with these ‘old’ social risks, 
social security schemes were developed, protecting the breadwinner against loss of 
income due to unemployment, old age or disability (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
Since the heydays of welfare state development, society has undergone some major 
changes. One of these changes has been the transformation of ideas about the role of 
women in family and society (Esping-Andersen, 2009). In Western societies, 
women’s roles have moved from an inward or ‘centripetal’ orientation where the 
woman’s focus was on the family, in the direction of a more outward or ‘centrifugal’ 
orientation towards the labour market (Jensen, 1996, p. 53). The increased labour 
market participation of women challenged the welfare state and generated new social 
risks regarding child- and eldercare, as well as a new need for work-family 
reconciliation policies (Bonoli, 2007; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Moreover, the 
fundamental assumption on which welfare states were built, a stable nuclear family 
in which a married couple would stay together ‘till death do us part’, became 
untenable (Bonoli, 2007; Pierson, 2001a). Increasing divorce rates and the emergence 
of new family forms challenged the focus of protecting the breadwinner income, 
especially in Bismarckian welfare states where social security guaranteed an income 
to the worker rather than to the citizen. Hence, the transition of the family creates 
pressures for welfare state expansion to cover new social risks, and for welfare state 
adaption to readjust social policies to new family forms. 
In this dissertation, I further explore the relationship between gender and the welfare 
state answering the following research question: How are opinions, preferences and 
actions related to women’s conditions and their roles in social policy throughout the 
life course? The dissertation comprises four articles, each focusing on different areas 
of social policy and different elements of the research question (opinions, 
preferences, actions and conditions or outcomes). The four articles of this dissertation 
are related to different stages in the life course. The research is thus linked to the role 
of the family in provision of welfare at different stages in life: childcare and (early) 
motherhood; eldercare and ‘late daughterhood’; the retirement transition; and poverty 
and income security after retirement. The goal of this introduction is to supply an 
overarching theoretical framework within which the four articles can be situated, 
discussing the central theories and concepts in greater depth, and to present the 
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methods used more thoroughly than is possible in one article. In this introduction, I 
briefly present the four articles and subsequently motivate my choice to discuss 
institutionalism and the concept of defamilisation in the theoretical framework. 
The first article, Do self-interest, ideology and national context influence opinions on 
government support for childcare for working parents? A multilevel analysis,1 deals 
with opinions of people regarding whether the state should be responsible for 
childcare for working parents, and as such is closely related the question of mothers’ 
employment. Using 2008 European Social Survey (ESS) data, it assesses to what 
extent five different hypotheses used in the literature on welfare opinions more 
generally can explain whether individuals favour government support for childcare 
services for working parents. Individuals’ ideologies, including both gender and 
welfare ideologies (‘ideology hypothesis’), and self-interest (‘self-interest hypo-
thesis’) are rather bad predictors of these opinions, particularly the latter. Even 
though the country-level accounts for only one tenth of total variance, the hypotheses 
related to the aggregate level perform much better. Certain aspects of childcare 
policies (‘institutional effect hypothesis’), in particular the average amount of 
childcare hours available per week, appear to affect opinions, supporting the 
institutional effects hypothesis. Also public interest (‘public interest hypothesis’) 
contributes to explaining opinions regarding government support for childcare, with 
these opinions being related to the female employment rate and the prevalence of 
part-time work. Finally, there are some important cultural effects of religious 
affiliation and the shared idea of welfare provision being a government responsibility 
in society (‘culture hypothesis’). 
The second article, When do people want to retire? The preferred retirement age gap 
between Eastern and Western Europe explained,2 co-authored with Ave Roots, aims 
to explain retirement preferences in Europe. The article deals with ageing and 
extending working lives, focusing on the gender gap in retirement preferences. For 
the analysis, we employ European Social Survey (ESS) data again, this time from 
2010. At the individual level, retirement preferences are linked to job demand and 
job control, typical predictors of issues such as stress and health problems. Also 
retirement policies affect individuals’ retirement preferences, in particular the legal 
retirement age. Differences between male and female legal retirement ages 
                                                          
1 De Tavernier, W. (2015). Do self-interest, ideology and national context influence opinions 
on government support for childcare for working parents? A multilevel analysis. In I. Salagean, 
C. Lomos & A. Hartung (Eds.), The young and the elderly at risk: Individual outcomes and 
contemporary policy challenges in European societies (pp. 181-204). Mortsel: Intersentia. 
2 De Tavernier, W., & Roots, A. (2015). When do people want to retire? The preferred 
retirement age gap between Eastern and Western Europe explained. Studies of Transition 
States and Societies, 7(3), 7-20. 
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substantially account for differences in retirement preferences between men and 
women. 
After a paper on opinions and one on preferences, the third article, Culture matters: 
Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in Europe,3 deals with 
women’s actions and their outcomes. Based on data from women in their 50s and 60s 
from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), I show how 
cultural norms about family responsibilities in eldercare are related to women’s 
decisions to give informal care for dependent elders. The paper also goes a step 
further and links these norms to outcomes of providing care in terms of well-being. 
The paper yields some interesting results. First, no relation is found between the 
employment of women and their involvement in informal care. Second, the share of 
women in the population supplying informal care is surprisingly stable over all 
countries in the dataset, though there are large differences in the amount of time spent 
caring on average in these countries. And third, cultural norms appear to be an 
important moderator of the relationship between caregiving and well-being: the 
informal caregiver burden seems to affect countries where family care is not the 
norm, while well-being is actually higher among informal carers in countries where 
family care is the norm. 
The fourth article, co-authored with Hans Peeters, Lifecourses, pensions and poverty 
among elderly women in Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history 
and pension regulations,4 focuses on outcomes and takes a more historical 
perspective. It illustrates with data from Belgian administrative registers how path 
dependent policies are not being adapted to women’s changing life courses leading 
to problematic outcomes – in casu poverty after retirement. Price and Ginn (2006) 
for instance note that women have lower pensions because of their lower participation 
rates in the labour market resulting from their care responsibilities at home and 
gender discrimination in wage setting, factors taken into account in pension 
calculation. However, in the paper we illustrate that whether this leads to 
precariousness after retirement very much depends on the pension regulations in 
place: the Belgian pension system is very protective against ‘old’ risks such as 
widowhood, but fails to offer social protection in case of ‘newer’ social risks such as 
divorce. 
The goal of the theoretical framework in this introduction is to explain how the 
different elements in the research question (opinions, preferences, actions, 
                                                          
3 De Tavernier, W. Culture matters: Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in 
Europe. Article submitted. 
4 Peeters, H., & De Tavernier, W. (2015). Lifecourses, pensions and poverty among elderly 
women in Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history and pension regulations. 
Ageing and Society, 35(6), 1171-1199. 
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outcomes), which are each discussed in a separate article, are related. As such, the 
introduction theoretically ties the articles together and places them within one broader 
theoretical framework. In the theoretical framework I discuss in more depth what 
constitutes opinions, preferences and actions of individuals, and how they are related 
to macro-level aspects such as norms and policies. The section also illuminates issues 
not explained in the articles, among others why policies tend to be stable over time 
even when societies change, and how emerging incongruences can impact both 
society and policy. New institutionalism offers a theoretical framework connecting 
all the dots, linking these different elements. The different institutionalisms each 
highlight different aspects of this relation between individual actions and structural 
factors such as policies and culture: rational choice institutionalism links policies and 
preferences with actions; sociological institutionalism connects norms and actions 
through internalisation of those norms; and historical institutionalism deals with the 
remaking of institutions through individual action. The research question also refers 
to women’s roles and social policy throughout the life course. Indeed, welfare states 
have played an important role in the institutionalisation of the life course, determining 
who to be and what to do depending on one’s chronological age (Kohli, 2007). 
Through this process, social policies and welfare cultures not only steer individuals’ 
life courses, but also connect events earlier in life to new outcomes. Whereas the 
articles each focus on a specific period in life, I discuss in the theoretical framework 
how these are linked over the life course through institutionalisation of the life course, 
thus exploring the relation between the life course perspective and institutionalist 
theory. Hence, in the first part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.1), I discuss 
‘new institutionalism’ in depth, explain how it ties the concepts of opinions, 
preferences and actions together and links them to norms and policies, and integrates 
the life course and institutionalist perspectives. 
The research question focuses on the effects of social policy on women’s conditions, 
preferences and actions. The concept of ‘defamilisation’ is a core concept in feminist 
social policy literature, initially launched as a critique of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
male-centred concept of decommodification, entirely overlooking the family as a 
provider of welfare and the role of women therein. As the provision of care within 
the family still largely remains the responsibility of women, the extent to which the 
state takes over the provision of care from the family has an important impact on 
women’s lives and increases their choices of what to do. Hence, defamilisation is the 
main concept related to the analysis of the role of gender and the family in social 
policy. All four articles deal with such issues of the role of gender and the family in 
social policy, and even though the concepts of familialism and defamilisation are 
explicitly referred to in two of the articles, none of the articles contain a critical 
discussion of the concept. Therefore, I provide a critical discussion of defamilisation 
in the second part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.2), showing that there is 
much debate and little agreement about what the concept exactly entails. 
Furthermore, by reflecting on the concept of defamilisation in light of the life course, 
I come to the conclusion that defamilisation could be a useful concept when studying 
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specific policies, though it might not be suitable for the analysis of networks of 
dependence throughout life. 
After the theoretical framework, where both institutionalism and defamilisation are 
discussed, I elaborate on the research methods used in the articles comprising this 
dissertation. The articles are all based on quantitative data, and make use of multilevel 
linear regression and logistic regression. As there is little room to discuss research 
methods at length in the articles, they are presented in more detail here, introducing 
the methods and why they are used, and discussing benefits and pitfalls. Finally, in 
the conclusions, the findings of the articles are related back to the theoretical 
framework presented here. 
 
7 
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The four articles deal with each of the elements of the research question – opinions, 
preferences, actions and conditions (or outcomes) – separately, and link them to 
social policies and/or cultural norms. However, several theoretical issues remain 
unexplored in the articles, as two take a very empirical approach (the articles on 
childcare opinions and poverty after retirement) and the theoretical framework is 
relatively limited in the other two, for instance regarding the relation between norms, 
roles or identities, and well-being in the article on informal eldercare. At the same 
time, all articles take an institutionalist approach, either by explicitly referring to the 
different institutionalisms with their respective logics (e.g., rational choice 
institutionalism and the logic of calculation, or sociological institutionalism and the 
logic of appropriateness), or implicitly by illustrating a situation that exemplifies an 
institutionalist logic (e.g., the inertia in Belgian pension legislation as a textbook case 
of the logic of path dependence in historical institutionalism, see Section 2.1.4). 
Moreover, the theoretical framework presented here also aims to transcend and 
integrate the stories of the four otherwise rather self-contained articles that make up 
this dissertation, tying together the core concepts of each article. Indeed, 
institutionalism offers a theoretical framework that allows for the incorporation of 
the four articles. The three different institutionalisms (rational choice, sociological 
and historical institutionalism) each focus on specific aspects of the relation between 
opinions, preferences, actions, conditions, norms and policies. In rational choice 
institutionalist thinking, individuals are rational actors seeking to execute their 
preferences; sociological institutionalism explains the origins of those preferences as 
the result of internalisation of societal norms in individuals’ identities; and historical 
institutionalism incorporates the temporal aspect by focusing on the reproduction 
(and occasional change) of norms and policies over time. In sum, institutionalism can 
not only explain how opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes are constituted and 
related to norms and policies, but also how they are interrelated. 
After presenting and reflecting on the different strands in institutionalist theory 
(Sections 2.1.1-2.1.4), institutionalism is linked to the life course (Section 2.1.5). The 
life course perspective links events taking place at different stages in life, linking 
things happening earlier to decisions and/or outcomes later in life. As such, it links 
childcare and eldercare issues to retirement decisions and outcomes in terms of 
pension income. This interdependence of life events and conditions over time is the 
result of the legal and normative institutionalisation of the life course. Perverse 
situations can – and do – occur when life course institutions change over time, for 
instance when legal life course institutions today have not adapted to the evolutions 
in normative life course institutions. 
THE FAMILY AS PROVIDER OF WELFARE 
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In the second part of the theoretical framework (Section 2.2), I discuss the concept of 
defamilisation. The concept has its roots in the feminist critique of the absence of the 
role of gender and the family in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) analysis of welfare 
regimes, and is now a central concept in the analysis of the role of gender and the 
family in welfare states. As such, I also refer explicitly to the concept in two articles 
(those on childcare opinions and informal eldercare), and even though it is not 
explicitly mentioned in the other two (the articles on retirement preferences and 
poverty after retirement), they both touch upon issues that could easily be analysed 
from a defamilisation perspective. However, at no point do I scrutinise the concept 
of defamilisation in the articles, despite there being some fundamental disagreements 
in the literature on what the concept exactly entails. Therefore, the section presents 
differences in understandings of the concept, and aims to go beyond those 
disagreements and present a specific conceptualisation of defamilisation. 
2.1. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
Following March and Olsen’s (1984) critique on political theory, ‘new institutiona-
list’ thinking has become the main paradigm in political science and policy studies. 
Whereas interests (actors’ preferences), power (distribution of resources) and 
‘constitutions’ (‘the constraints imposed by the rules of the game’ (March & Olsen, 
1984, p. 739)) were considered as exogenous factors in political theory of the era, the 
authors argue that all three are at least partially endogenous to the political process. 
These critiques are incorporated in different strands of new institutionalism. Hall and 
Taylor (1996) distinguish three strands in new institutionalist thinking: rational 
choice, sociological and historical institutionalism. However, together with several 
other authors, they argue that there are only two different approaches to how 
institutions matter for individual behaviour in institutionalism: the economic 
‘calculus approach’ and the sociological ‘cultural approach’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mahoney, 2000; Searing, 1991). In the calculus approach, 
individuals are strategic actors acting rationally to maximise their utility; in the 
cultural approach, individuals interpret the world and act based on norms, ideas and 
world views. These two approaches coincide with the basic principles of rational 
choice and sociological institutionalism, respectively. 
Historical institutionalists, in explaining how exactly ‘history matters’ for current 
institutions, rely on either one or a combination of both approaches. As such, much 
like life course research,5 historical institutionalism is a perspective more than a 
theory on how institutions develop and interact with individuals. In fact, one could 
even argue that the time dimension inherent to the dialectical process of the institution 
and action constituting one another means that sociological institutionalism is 
                                                          
5 Radl (2014) indeed notes that the life course idea is concerned with the same logic of ‘path 
dependence’ that also forms the basis of historical institutionalism. 
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historical by its very nature: institutions are seen as prior to individual action, which 
in turn confirms and recreates institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 2010; 
Finnemore, 1996; Scott, 2008; Zafirovski, 2004; Zucker, 1977). 
Some authors (e.g., Ginosar, 2014; Mackay, Kenny & Chappell, 2010) add a fourth, 
more recent type of institutionalism: constructivist (Hay, 2006; 2004) or discursive 
institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010), which focuses on the role of ideas and how they 
spread. However, as none of the articles in this thesis deal with discourses, I will not 
go into this issue. In this section, I first discuss the different types of institutionalism 
with a focus on opinions, preferences, actions and outcomes; then I will integrate the 
different institutionalisms and combine them into a life course perspective. 
2.1.1. RATIONAL CHOICE, PREFERENCES AND PREFERENCE 
THEORY 
Hall and Taylor’s (1996) ‘calculus approach’ is at the core of rational choice theory. 
Individuals have a fixed set of preferences, rationally choose how to act and do so 
strategically and instrumentally to fulfil those preferences as much as possible – that 
is, to maximise their utility. As such, action requires ‘extensive calculation’ (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 945). Labour supply theory is the application of rational choice 
theory on the decision to enter the labour market. A person enters the labour market 
if the value of working – that is, the wage – is higher than the value of not working 
(Blau, Ferber & Winkler, 2010, p. 89). Utility is derived from the consumption of 
goods and services, which requires both non-working time and an income from work. 
Therefore, the individual choses what he or she considers the ‘optimal’ combination 
of income from work (and thus working time) on the one hand, and non-working time 
and consumption on the other. As such, the individual is assumed to prefer more 
income and less working time. 
In the rational choice institutionalist view, institutions are formal rules agreed to by 
rational actors to reduce the uncertainty of how others will act, and of the 
consequences of their own actions (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Peters, 2012). 
The major advantage of rational choice institutionalism is that it has a very clear 
explanation for why institutions affect individuals: individuals follow institutions in 
response to rewards or punishments attached. As individuals are assumed to have 
fixed preferences – a preference for time and money in labour supply theory (Cloïn, 
Keuzenkamp & Plantenga, 2011; Hakim, 2000) –, they respond to institutions in a 
rational way, either by using them to their benefit or by trying to change or remove 
them if they think they limit their utility maximisation (Ginosar, 2014; Peters, 2012; 
Zafirovski, 2004). 
Rational choice theory has received many critiques. Several authors have pointed out 
that the assumption of fixed preferences is problematic. Rational choice theory 
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cannot explain where preferences come from, and if they are indeed fixed,6 then 
institutional change can only occur if circumstances change – meaning that both 
preferences and institutional change are exogenous to the model (Bell, 2011; 
Clemens & Cook, 1999; Edeling, 1998; Hakim, 2000; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 
2012). Also the assumption of rational and self-centred individuals has been critiqued 
for limiting individual agency to rational utility maximisation and overlooking 
alternative reasons for individuals’ actions. Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard (2011b), for 
instance, argue that the assumption of self-centred and egoistic actors is incompatible 
with the moral roots of care work and cannot explain the gendered division of labour 
therein. 
Hakim (2000) aims to find a compromise between rational choice theory and some 
of these critiques. She criticises the standard assumption in labour supply theory that 
women prefer family life over paid labour: ‘Economists’ usual assumption is that all 
women give priority to family activities and responsibilities, simply because it is only 
the female that gives birth’ (p. 4). Instead, she proposes a different theory, ‘preference 
theory’, arguing that women have heterogeneous preferences regarding paid work 
and the family, and that their labour market behaviour largely corresponds to these 
preferences. Women, Hakim (2000) argues, can broadly be categorised into three 
groups based on their preferences: home-centred women with a preference for staying 
at home and focusing on the family; work-centred women who focus on their careers; 
and adaptive women who seek to strike a balance between both, leading to interrupted 
and unplanned careers and enrolment in part-time work. 
Despite the effort to reconcile rational choice theory with the normative framework 
of sociology, pointing out that preferences are embedded in ‘local social and cultural 
institutions’ (p. 168) and that they ‘do not predict outcomes with complete certainty’ 
(p. 169), Hakim’s (2000) preference theory does not escape these same criticisms. 
Particularly, her optimism about the decreasing structural and cultural constraints on 
women’s choices, and the idea that women ‘can choose to reproduce or transform 
social structures’ (Hakim, 2000, p. 170) has been the subject of harsh criticism. 
Several authors have argued that Hakim underestimates the role of cultural 
constraints, from the role norms play in shaping preferences to the constraints they 
place on the choices women make about commitment to work and family life (James, 
2009; Johnstone & Lee, 2016; Lewis, 2006; Närvi, 2012; Pfau-Effinger, 2012), and 
that women’s options remain very constrained due to structural and institutional 
issues such as the lack of childcare or suitable jobs (Crompton & Lyonette, 2005; 
                                                          
6 As rational choice institutionalists take preferences as a ‘given’, they do not occupy 
themselves with the question of where preferences come from. While disregarding the origins 
of preferences de facto indeed means the assumption of fixed preferences, rational choice 
theory does not necessarily involve the theoretical assumption of fixed preferences (e.g., 
Pollak, 2002, p. 5). 
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2006; Debacker, 2008; James, 2009; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kumra, 2010; 
Lewis, 2006; McDowell, Ray, Perrons, Fagon & Ward, 2005; McRae, 2003; Närvi, 
2012; Radl, 2014; Stähli, Le Goff, Levy & Widmer, 2009; Steiber & Haas, 2009; 
Tomlinson, 2006). In the words of McRae (2003, p. 333): ‘Hakim appears to confuse 
voluntary action with genuine or unconstrained choice’. 
After criticising economists for assuming preferences are stable, Hakim (2000) 
makes the same assumption when stating that women remain faithful to their 
preference groups. This assumption has also been the subject of criticism in many 
studies, arguing that women cannot be categorised into three distinct groups 
(Hagelskamp, Hughes, Yoshikawa & Chaudry, 2011; James, 2009; McDowell et al., 
2005; McRae, 2003), that there is little consistency in group membership over time 
(Campbell & van Wanrooy, 2013; Johnstone & Lee, 2016), and that preferences not 
only determine women’s employment choices, but that women also adapt their 
preferences to the employment situation they find themselves in (Kan, 2007; Kanji 
& Cahusac, 2015; Schober & Scott, 2012; Steiber & Haas, 2012). Furthermore, 
Hakim (2000) claims that, while family-centred and work-centred women have stable 
preferences over time, adaptive women would be more responsive to policies as their 
preferences are more dependent on changes in opportunities or constraints. This 
claim generates a duality in the understanding of the concept of ‘preferences’. With 
the term ‘preferences’, she refers both to more ‘fundamental’ preferences that are 
stable over time, such as being oriented towards the family or towards the labour 
market, and to preferences for concrete actions, such as staying at home, working 
part-time etc. Indeed, there is no reason for adaptive women’s fundamental 
preferences (combining both a qualitative working and family life) to change 
depending on the policies a government passes. But their preferences for concrete 
actions will be affected by changes in opportunity structures that facilitate this 
combination or make certain options more attractive. 
Finally, both labour supply and preference theory assume a far-going individualisa-
tion, where the individual makes decisions by him or herself. However, the reality is 
more complicated, with partners negotiating the division of labour within the 
household (Duncan, Edwards, Reynolds & Alldred, 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 2004; 
Krüger & Levy, 2001; Närvi, 2012). Research shows that, among couples, the 
partners’ attitudes also affect one’s involvement in home work and childcare (Cooke, 
L. P., 2006; Gaunt & Scott, 2014), and that husbands’ attitudes affect women’s 
employment decisions (Debacker, 2008; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kanji, 2011). 
Furthermore, retirement decisions are made at the household level (Loretto & 
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Vickerstaff, 2012). The idea of negotiation is entirely absent from these rationalist 
approaches.7 
Despite all these critiques, rational choice theories do contribute to a better under-
standing of women’s employment and care choices. It can help us understand why 
and how individuals respond to policies. Indeed, the major advantage of rational 
choice institutionalism is that it offers a very clear explanation for why the institutions 
at the macro-level affect individuals at the micro-level: they follow institutions in 
response to rewards or punishments attached. Most agree that personal preferences 
are important for the decisions individuals make, even though the discussion is about 
the extent to which this decisional latitude is limited by structural and cultural 
constraints. 
The rational choice institutionalist perspective is included in the article on childcare 
opinions (for a discussion on opinions and rational choice institutionalism, see 
Section 2.1.3) and informal eldercare. In the former, the assumption is that 
individuals would support policies from which they (could) benefit; the rational 
choice perspective in the latter refers to considerations of the division of time between 
work and informal care that are at the core of labour supply theory. Finally, though 
not explicitly done so in the article on retirement preferences, the relation between 
the individual’s health and retirement preferences could be analysed from a rational 
choice perspective. Indeed, the desire to quit paid work may be an understandable 
rational response to health problems in case working longer may jeopardise health 
further, or when the health problems negatively affect the individual’s productivity 
and therefore his or her earnings capacity, reducing the gap between (potential) work 
and non-work income. 
2.1.2. SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM: NORMS AND 
PREFERENCES 
Apart from the ‘calculus approach’, Hall and Taylor (1996) also identify a ‘cultural 
approach’ that is at the core of sociological institutionalism. In this approach, 
individuals act upon their ideas and worldviews, as well as on their interpretations of 
reality. Sociological institutionalism has a very different nature compared to rational 
choice institutionalism, first and foremost because the concept of ‘institution’ has a 
very different meaning (Alasuutari, 2015; Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; 
Ginosar, 2014; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). While rational choice 
institutionalists reduce institutions to formal regulations, sociological institutionalists 
                                                          
7 This does not mean that negotiation is not present in rational choice theory in general. In 
Gerry Becker’s New Home Economics, for instance, there is a movement toward the inclusion 
of a bargaining perspective (Chiappori & Lewbel, 2015, p. 411, see e.g. Becker, 1974). 
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have a much wider understanding of the concept, referring to collective understan-
dings about how one should act: 
From this perspective, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates 
for interpretation and action. The individual is seen as an entity deeply 
embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and 
routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation 
and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 939) 
Institutions in the sociological sense comprise not just formal rules, but also shared 
norms and ideas about what is right or wrong, cognitive scripts and routines, symbols 
and meanings (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Denzau & North, 1994; Finnemore, 1996; 
Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b; Schmidt, 2010; Scott, 2008; 
Searle, 2005; Zucker, 1977). In other words, sociological institutions define which 
behaviour is appropriate in a certain context (Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mackay, 
Monro & Waylen, 2009; March & Olsen, 1989; Olsen, 2009; Schmidt, 2010; Scott, 
2008). In this understanding of the concept, institutions and culture are synonymous 
(Alasuutari, 2015; Grendstad & Selle, 1995; Hall & Taylor, 1996). In contrast to 
rational choice institutionalism, where institutions are considered exogenous to the 
individual, these cultural ideas are internalised through socialisation processes, 
shaping individuals’ roles, identities and preferences (Edeling, 1998; Finnemore, 
1996; Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hodgson, 2007; Immergut, 1998; 
Mackay et al., 2009; Olsen, 2009; Powell & Colyvas, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2016; 
Schmidt, 2010) – hence, institutions not only constrain individuals, they also 
constitute or ‘mould’ them and as such play an enabling role (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Finnemore, 1996; Grendstad & Selle, 1995; Hodgson, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; Searle, 
2005). Once internalised, individuals act upon their norms and values, their beliefs 
of what is good and bad or right and wrong (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b). By 
doing so, individuals confirm and recreate institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 
2010; Finnemore, 1996; Hodgson, 2007; Powell & Colyvas, 2012; Scott, 2008; 
Zucker, 1977). Hence, institutions and individual action are mutually constitutive. 
Over time, these norms and practices are formalised by policy-makers seeking 
legitimacy: by acting in accordance with certain norms, actors and their actions are 
seen as legitimate by those with whom they share these norms (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Mackay et al., 2009; Miller & Banaszak-Holl, 2005). 
Hence, in sociological institutionalism, cultural norms and ideas are internalised 
through socialisation processes, where they do not just shape individuals’ 
preferences, but the individuals themselves. Some authors refer to this as shaping 
identities (Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Hagelskamp et al., 2011; Kanji & Cahusac, 2015), 
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others as dispositions8 (James, 2009; Vincent, 2016) or mental models (Denzau & 
North, 1994). As a result of the internalised nature of sociological institutions, they 
function in a rather different way than institutions as perceived by rational choice 
institutionalists. Whereas in the latter case, the individual has to be aware of the 
existence of the institution to consider the costs and benefits of acting upon it as 
compared to those of alternative courses of action, sociological institutions ‘influence 
behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what 
one can imagine oneself doing in a given context’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). 
Indeed, taboos or ‘unthinkable actions’ are a fundamental part of identities 
(Fershtman, Gneezy & Hoffman, 2011). 
The fact that individuals act upon their mental models does not mean that sociological 
institutionalism denies rationality, as certain critics suggest (Mackay et al., 2010; e.g., 
Hakim, 2000). While some merely suggest that rationality is limited by certain 
boundaries (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Scherger, 2009), others have 
argued that decisions about such fundamental issues such as work or care are made 
with a different kind of rationality: an ‘internal conversation’ (Archer, 2004) in which 
individuals ‘“weigh” one role against another’ and ‘evaluate their social concerns 
against their other commitments’ (Archer, 2004, p. 293), or a ‘moral rationality’ 
(Duncan et al., 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 2004), in which individuals ‘take such 
decisions with reference to moral and socially negotiated (not individual) views about 
what behaviour is right and proper’ (Duncan et al., 2003, p. 310). Utility maximising 
rationality only comes in second place. Through this process of moral rationality, 
individuals turn their wider norms and ideas about how to act into preferences for 
concrete action: ‘This preference is not readily accommodated (…), but depends 
rather on moral reasoning about the best way of allocating time and resources in 
relation to other people’s needs’ (Duncan & Irwin, 2004, p. 392). This moral 
rationality plays an important role when the individual experiences conflicting norms 
in a certain situation. Such a ‘“lack of ﬁt” (…) enables individuals to perceive 
previously taken-for-granted conditions, and opens up possibilities for change’ 
(James, 2009, p. 318). Indeed, mismatches between norms are the drivers of 
institutional change in sociological institutionalism, meaning that change in 
sociological institutionalism is at least partly endogenous to the model (Finnemore, 
1996; Kangas & Vestheim, 2010; Scott, 2008). 
The article on retirement preferences includes a section on sociological institutiona-
lism related to the question of how formal rules are internalised into individuals, 
discussing both this non-economic form of rationality and a certain ‘embodiment’ of 
                                                          
8 Interestingly, Hakim (2000) also refers the family-centred, home-centred and adaptive 
categories as ‘“packages” of predispositions’ (p. 189, emphasis added), suggesting that they 
are indeed of a more fundamental nature and do not change with changing opportunity 
structures the way the preferences for concrete action of adaptive women do. 
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formal regulations through the creation of habits. Further, sociological institutiona-
lism is also present in the article on informal eldercare with its strong focus on the 
role of norms, both in eldercare decisions and outcomes in terms of well-being. 
Though sociological institutionalism is not explicitly mentioned in the other two 
articles, both articles illustrate the role of norms in the formation of individuals’ 
opinions (article on childcare opinions) and in women’s employment decisions 
(article on poverty in retirement). 
2.1.3. INTERMEDIARY REFLECTIONS ON OPINIONS, ACTIONS AND 
OUTCOMES9 
Now that I have explained both rational choice and sociological institutionalist 
approaches, and distinguished mental models (or ‘fundamental preferences’) from 
preferences for concrete action – from now on the term ‘preferences’ will only refer 
to the latter10 –, the question is how opinions fit into this scheme. Concepts such as 
norms, let alone ‘internalised norms’ have no place in a rational choice institutionalist 
view, as the individual merely is a rational actor deciding on how to maximise his or 
her own utility. Therefore, opinions are only relevant from this perspective if they 
refer to preferences for action. Within rational choice theory, such preferences reflect 
the self-interest of the individual, as it refers to the individual choosing to maximise 
utility. 
In a sociological institutionalist view, opinions can reflect both mental models and 
preferences, though classifying opinions in either category has important 
consequences for how we can analyse and explain opinions. If we were to perceive 
them as reflections of mental models, then we can expect broader culture in society 
to affect opinions, but it would mean that we cannot analyse opinions as a function 
of other opinions, as they would be at the same level (both reflecting mental models) 
and therefore they would at best correlate, but could not be causally related to one 
another – making an explanation of one opinion in terms of the other irrelevant. If, 
on the other hand, we classify them as preferences, then we can explain them in 
relation to mental models, meaning that we could relate specific opinions to more 
fundamental ideas about how the individual sees the world. But if we classify 
opinions as preferences, then we cannot assume that culture in wider society would 
have any effect on these opinions: cultural norms and ideas only influence 
                                                          
9 In the remainder of the text, I will only use the term ‘institutions’ to refer to formal rules, 
state structures and policies to avoid confusion. Institutions in the sociological sense will be 
referred to with terms such as norms, cultural values or beliefs. 
10 This is in line with, for instance, Campbell and van Wanrooy (2013), who note that 
preferences are the result not only of fundamental ideas about how the world works, but are 
also affected by the perceived feasibility of certain options. Moreover, for March and Olsen 
(1989), preferences are ‘individual interests’. 
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preferences through their internalisation, meaning that if mental models are 
controlled for, higher-level cultural variables should not have any effect. 
Nonetheless, Likki and Staerkle (2015), for instance, find that individuals’ opinions 
are affected by societal ideas of ‘welfare dependency culture’, even when controlling 
for individual ideology. 
Regarding actions, the transition from preferences to actions is not a direct one, 
resulting from conflicting institutions requiring a certain rationality of the individual. 
Several authors have pointed at ‘tensions’, ‘mismatches’ or ‘gaps’ between 
institutions and the ‘dilemmas’ or ‘conflicts’ they bring about (Clemens & Cook, 
1999; Denzau & North, 1994; Edeling, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Grendstad & Selle, 
1995; Olsen, 2009; 2007; Peters, Pierre & King, 2005; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 
2011a; Schmidt, 2010). In a first step, which one could call consideration, the 
individual evaluates possible courses of action based on conflicting preferences. In 
rational choice institutionalism, these are calculations and strategic decisions aimed 
at fulfilling preferences; in sociological institutionalism rationality is about 
considering different available options through a lens of internalised dispositions or 
mental models (Edeling, 1998; Immergut, 1998; Selznick, 1996; Thelen, 1999). The 
second step in the transition from preference to action is that of negotiation. 
Negotiations not only take place within the household to determine the division of 
work (Cooke, L. P., 2006; Debacker, 2008; Duncan et al., 2003; Duncan & Irwin, 
2004; Gaunt & Scott, 2014; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007; Kanji, 2011; Närvi, 2012), 
but in the case of eldercare, the care has to be negotiated at least between caregiver 
and care-receiver (Zechner & Valokivi, 2012). 
In case of conflicting internalised norms (or ‘role-identities’ (Gaunt & Scott, 2014)), 
the individual may have difficulties coping with the consequences of his or her 
decisions. Acting in a way that does not conform with one’s mental models can lead 
to severe strain. Stähli et al. (2009, p. 333) note that ‘preferences have little impact 
on mothers’ labour force participation, but explain a good deal of their frustration if 
the factual situation does not correspond to their wishes’. Kanji and Cahusac (2015), 
for instance, describe how female professionals face identity problems when quitting 
their jobs to take care of their children – a situation of strain lasting until these women 
finally decided to let go of their professional identities to focus on their roles as 
mothers. Schober and Scott (2012, p. 526) note that about a quarter of ‘new’ parents 
change their gender role attitudes after childbirth, especially ‘if paid work and care 
arrangements are at odds with their prenatal gender role attitudes’. Also Steiber and 
Haas (2012) argue for a reciprocal relationship between attitudes and behaviour. Such 
outcomes resulting from conflicting institutions are the drivers of institutional 
change. 
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2.1.4. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND SUBOPTIMAL 
OUTCOMES 
According to Schmidt (2010), historical institutionalism has its own logic: just like 
rational choice institutionalism is built on the ‘logic of calculation’ and sociological 
institutionalism is characterised by the ‘logic of appropriateness’, historical 
institutionalism would be based on the ‘logic of path dependence’. Path dependence 
is the central concept in historical institutionalism: it refers to policies and institutions 
being very difficult to change or replace once they are put in place (Peters, 2012). 
However, path dependence is a ‘black box’; for its mechanism to be explained beyond 
the mere statement that ‘history matters’, one has to rely either on the calculus or the 
culture approach – or both (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Knill & Lenschow, 2001; Mahoney, 
2000; Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011b).11 Knill and Lenschow (2001, p. 189) 
boldly describe historical institutionalism as ‘borrowing somewhat eclectically from 
the other two schools though with a special appreciation for the influence of history 
for present-day policy making’. Hence, I would argue that path dependence is a 
mechanism rather than a logic in itself. What does distinguish historical institutiona-
lism from the others, however, is the central role of collective actors such as 
organisations, whereas rational choice and sociological institutionalism primarily 
focus on individuals as actors and their relation with policies and norms. 
Several authors indeed identify a sociological institutionalist branch in historical 
institutionalism, dealing with the relation between cultural values in society and 
formal institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 1999). Denzau and 
North (1994) and Roland (2004), for instance, argue that cultural norms evolve 
slowly but constantly (which is an assumption and thus external to the model), while 
formal institutions have long periods of stability occasionally interrupted by 
‘punctuated’ change. This fast change in formal institutions happens when the gap 
between the static formal institutions and the incrementally changing norms in 
society become too big and lead to tensions – so formal institutions are being 
‘recalibrated’ to the changed society. Also Pfau-Effinger (2005; 2011) points out that 
policy change and cultural change happen at different speeds. In what she calls the 
‘welfare arrangement’ approach, welfare policies are embedded in welfare culture, 
that is, shared ideas about the welfare state (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; 2012). As long as 
these ideas are largely coherent and stable in a society, policies are likely to follow 
the same path. Path departure occurs in societies which are divided on welfare 
cultures or where values are changing. Pfau-Effinger (2005) gives the example of the 
                                                          
11 Note that we only discuss path dependence as ‘self-reinforcing sequences’ and not as 
‘reactive sequences’ in Mahoney’s (2000) typology. The latter refers to sequences with a 
dialectic character, where responses and counter-responses follow each other up, which is not 
in line with the usual interpretation of the concept of path dependence in historical institutio-
nalism. 
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Netherlands, where ideas about the family have been changing in the direction of 
increased orientation of women towards the labour market since the 1960s. Policy 
change, on the other hand, only started occurring from the 1980s onwards. She 
contributes this to path dependence: ‘the social actors in the process are still behaving 
under the influence of the structures and models they have challenged’ (Pfau-
Effinger, 2005, p. 14). Hence, Pfau-Effinger (2005) agrees that social policies are 
especially prone to change if the existing policies do not match dominant cultural 
values or the social system in society. However, she contests the idea that cultural 
change necessarily is a slow-moving process, as Denzau and North (1994) and 
Roland (2004) claim. Pfau-Effinger (2011) convincingly illustrates this point using 
data on Spain, where a large group of women are dissatisfied with the availability of 
professional childcare, despite efforts of the Spanish government to generate 
childcare places during the 2000s. The fact that institutional change cannot keep up 
with cultural change indicates that the transition in women’s orientations from 
family-oriented or ‘centripetal’ to labour market oriented or ‘centrifugal’ values 
(Jensen, 1996; Jensen & Møberg, 2011) happens at a rather high pace in Spain. 
However, one could argue that the time dimension inherent to the dialectical process 
of institution and action constituting one another means that sociological institutiona-
lism is historical by its very nature: institutions are seen as prior to individual action, 
which in turn confirms and recreates institutions (Bell, 2011; Buhari-Gulmez, 2010; 
Finnemore, 1996; Scott, 2008; Zafirovski, 2004; Zucker, 1977).  
Following Paul Pierson (2000; 2001b; Peters, 2012), much of the literature on 
historical institutionalism has tried to explain why path dependence exists and 
institutions tend to reinforce themselves, which follows a rational choice approach 
and assumes that actors are rational and pursuing their self-interest – both 
organisational and individual actors. Organisations have competing preferences and 
interests, and they do or do not manage to implement those into policy depending on 
the amount of power they have. This assumption of rationality is very visible in Myles 
and Pierson’s (2001, p. 312) definition of path dependence: ‘each step along a path 
produces consequences which make that path more attractive in the next round and 
raises the costs of shifting to an alternative path’. This definition follows North’s 
(1990) idea of path dependence as increasing returns, explaining why policies tend 
to stick to a chosen path as a result of transaction costs, even if more efficient 
alternatives are available (Pierson, 2000; 2001c; Thelen, 1999; Wood, 2001). 
Increasing returns not only lead to ‘positive feedback processes’ (Pierson, 2000), 
power does as well (Mahoney, 2000; March & Olsen, 1989; Thelen, 1999). Much of 
the literature in fact focuses on how institutions generate power for certain 
organisations and not for others (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2000). Existing 
political institutions affect the organisations involved in negotiations on welfare state 
reform, the power relations between them and the strategies they use to pursue their 
interests and preferences (Swank, 2001; Wood, 2001). As such, institutions are tools 
or ‘means’ organisations have at their disposal to exert power and realise their goals 
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(Clasen, 2005). Therefore, those who have the upper hand in the power relation will 
be eager to protect the existing institutions or even strengthen them, so as to secure 
their powerful position (Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 1999). However, the power delivered 
by institutions can be counterbalanced by a second source of power for political 
organisations: public support. Discourses play an important role in acquiring public 
support (Clasen, 2005; Kitschelt, 2001). 
Based on their competing preferences and relative power derived from public support 
and the institutional framework, organisations negotiate for changes in policies and 
institutions. Hence policies and institutions are both independent and dependent 
variables in policy change (Clasen, 2005), leading to a cyclical process. Because of 
this self-reinforcing cycle, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) critique historical institutiona-
lism for its determinism. However, several historical institutionalist authors have 
rejected this critique, arguing that path dependence is not a deterministic force, but 
rather makes certain choices more probable than others – hence it is a matter of 
probability rather than possibility (Clasen, 2005; Pierson, 2001c; Swank, 2001; 
Wood, 2001). Change is the result of unintended consequences of policies (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996) or evolutions in the domestic and international context: economic 
changes such as fluctuations in GDP or unemployment, political changes such as the 
emergence of new parties or fractions and social changes (Bonoli, 2001; Clasen, 
2005; Swank, 2001; Wood, 2001). The critique that change is exogenous to the model 
in historical institutionalism (Bell, 2011; Kickert & van der Meer, 2011; Thelen, 
1999) is rejected by March and Olsen (1989; 2006), arguing that change is the result 
of contradicting interests struggling for power (March & Olsen, 1989) or ‘enduring 
gaps between institutional ideals and institutional practices’ (March & Olsen, 2006, 
p. 12). As such, the sociological strand of historical institutionalism and its focus on 
incongruences between cultural norms and formal rules as drivers of institutional 
change are brought in again. 
While the logic of path dependence is good at explaining why welfare retrenchment 
does not take place, it has greater difficulties making sense of emerging policy fields 
(Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2005). Hence, it can explain why pension policies have 
been very difficult to reform despite the financial pressure generated by pay-as-you-
go schemes (Clasen, 2005; Myles & Pierson, 2001), while it cannot explain the 
emergence of family policies (Clasen, 2005; Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015). As 
path dependence is better at explaining welfare retrenchment than welfare expansion, 
Clasen (2005) notes that it is more useful when analysing the development of policies 
dealing with ‘old social risks’ than for policies targeting ‘new social risks’ such as 
family policy. This gap can be filled by sociological historical institutionalism, as 
from this point of view the emergence of family policies is the political response to 
changing ideas in society about the role of the family as provider of welfare, and the 
conflicts generated by the incongruence of ‘old’ policies with these ‘new’ norms. 
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2015) indeed note that, while family policy emergence 
was mainly related to advocacy of women’s organisations in the 1980s and 1990s, its 
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expansion since the 2000s is the result of broad public support stemming from a shift 
in cultural ideas about female employment and the family. 
While three of the articles focus on the effects of norms and policy rather than on 
their formation, the article on poverty in retirement is a textbook example of path 
dependence. It illustrates how Belgian pension policies have largely remained the 
same since the 1950s, disregarding the major changes in family consistency and 
women’s roles that took place over the same period. The high poverty risk certain 
women face is an unintended consequence of this incongruence and may well trigger 
policy change in the future. 
2.1.5. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIFE COURSE 
The life course perspective links events taking place at different moments in life, 
linking events that happened in the past to decisions and outcomes later on. Through 
the institutionalisation of the life course, especially present in pension policies where 
earlier labour market participation determines access to and generosity of pension 
income, childcare and eldercare affect retirement processes and pension incomes. 
Therefore, the inclusion of the life course perspective contributes to the integration 
of the separate articles, each taking place at different stages in life. The 
institutionalisation of the life course is one of the main theoretical insights in the life 
course literature (Dannefer, 2010; Kohli, 2007; Radl, 2014). The idea essentially is 
that chronological age has become the basis for formal rules and cultural norms about 
who to be and what to do. In other words, many institutions, both formal and 
sociological, are related to age. By setting age requirements, the welfare state is one 
of the main drivers of institutionalisation of the life course into formal rules – 
consider the ages of compulsory education and formal retirement ages, delineating 
three distinct periods in life: education, employment and retirement (Cooke, M., 
2006; Kohli, 2007; Möhring, 2016). As Radl (2014) points out, such ‘blueprints’ for 
life help individuals make complex decisions, such as when to retire. 
Many norms are age-dependent too, and act as ‘social time schedules’ (Scherger, 
2009). Women in their late twenties and early thirties are expected to have children; 
many workers above age 50 face discrimination as they are considered too old to be 
employed, to be productive or creative. Several of these norms are also gender-
specific, typically related to reproduction and care tasks regarding children and 
dependent parents. As such, life courses are not only institutionalised, they are also 
gendered (Moen, 2011; Radl, 2014). Life course norms have especially changed for 
women, with younger generations of women being more and more expected to be 
oriented to the labour market (James, 2009). Age-related norms are reinforced by 
social policies: by giving individuals a certain status, such as ‘pensioner’ or 
‘unemployed’, the welfare state gives individuals an identity and including norms 
about how to behave or not to behave (Möhring, 2016). As a pensioner, you can enjoy 
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your ‘well-earned rest’; as an unemployed person you are expected to actively look 
for work. 
The institutionalisation of life courses not only affects individuals at a certain age, it 
also bridges and binds periods in life – or, as Möhring puts it, they ‘[involve] a 
transmission of achievements in one life phase to subsequent phases’. For instance, 
unstable employment earlier in one’s career can affect one’s retirement possibilities 
later on in life (Raymo, Warren, Sweeney, Hauser & Ho, 2010). Spanning over longer 
periods, tensions can emerge between formal life course institutions and norms 
related to the life course (Krüger & Levy, 2001). Pension entitlements, for instance, 
are typically related to one’s labour market participation earlier in life. Pension 
systems are designed based on a male breadwinner model, with good old age income 
protection for those with stable, full-time careers. Hence, they have difficulties 
coping with today’s more diverse life courses, especially those of women (Han & 
Moen, 1999). In other words, the change in formal life course institutions cannot keep 
up with the change in life course norms. As such, social policies contribute to 
gendered cumulative advantages and disadvantages over the life course: reducing 
one’s involvement in paid labour to take care of children not only leads to immediate 
income loss, it also reduces pension entitlements in old age (Cooke, M., 2006; 
Harrington Meyer & Parker, 2010; Worts, Sacker, McMunn & McDonough, 2013). 
Such a cycle of cumulative disadvantages can also be started by ‘disruptive events’ 
such as an accident or job loss (Pearlin, Schieman, Fazio & Meersman, 2005). 
A major point of discussion in life course research is to what extent lives have become 
more individualised – that is, to what extent they have become de-institutionalised. 
While Berger et al. (1993) note an increasing de-standardisation of life courses since 
the 1950s, McMunn et al. (2015, p. 60), for instance, find that ‘[w]omen’s and men’s 
work-family life courses are becoming increasingly similar’. According to Scherger 
(2009) and Worts et al. (2013), individualisation has led to a transformation of 
institutions from involving direct sanctions to containing incentives. Hence, the 
individual has more decisional latitude over his or her own life course, but is 
considered responsible for the choices he or she makes and the outcomes of these 
choices. Moreover, both studies point not only at disembedding tendencies, but also 
at re-embedding ones, such as the emerging expectation for everyone to be in the 
labour market. This tendency of individualisation of responsibility, which is also 
present in social policy, becomes especially problematic when there is a mismatch 
between political and cultural developments: in Pascall and Lewis’ (2004) view, 
unpaid care workers will be the victims of these developments. Moreover, Duncan et 
al. (2003) and Duncan and Irwin (2004) criticise this idea of individualisation as 
increased individual choice, which has been the basis of social policy reforms, while 
in reality decisions affecting the life course are not individual but negotiated ones. 
This idea of life courses being formed through continuous negotiations with others 
when making decisions is known in the life course literature as ‘linked lives’ (Levy, 
Gauthier & Widmer, 2006). Loretto and Vickerstaff (2012), for instance, show how 
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retirement decisions are negotiated at the household level, in which several concerns 
are discussed including personal health, health of other family members, financial 
and family situation. 
2.1.6. CONCLUSION 
Institutionalist theory connects the different elements of the research question, each 
a subject of one of the articles in this dissertation. Rational choice institutionalism 
takes preferences, typically time and money, as a given, and subsequently assumes 
that individuals as rational actors act in a strategic way to fulfil their preferences. 
Sociological institutionalism sees these preferences as rooted in the ‘mental models’ 
or identities of individuals, themselves the result of internalisation of norms in 
society. By acting in accordance with the norm, the norm itself is confirmed. Hence, 
opinions can refer either to the more fundamental ‘mental models’, or to more 
concrete and action-oriented preferences. Deciding on whether a specific opinion 
reflects the individual’s mental models or one’s preferences, has direct consequences 
for the types of variables that can be taken into account to explain the opinion: if it 
concerns a concrete preference, then both self-interest and indicators reflecting the 
individual’s mental models can be used as explanatory variables; if the opinion on 
the contrary is a reflection of the individual’s mental models, then it only makes sense 
to include variables about norms at the societal or aggregate level in the model. In 
the article on childcare opinions, this distinction is not made, combining cultural, 
self-interest and ideological indicators at the same time. 
The article on retirement preferences investigates, among others, the relation between 
the formal retirement age and retirement preferences. Both from a rational choice and 
a sociological institutionalist perspective, one would hypothesise that a lower official 
or legal retirement age means that individuals will want to retire earlier. However, 
the logics explaining the same outcome are different: a rational choice institutionalist 
would expect an individual who is offered a sufficient non-work income to retire 
from the labour market, as it would supply the individual with both time and income; 
a sociological institutionalist would argue that individuals internalise the retirement 
age as an age norm, making it socially accepted or even expected for the individual 
to retire at a certain age – hence turning a legal boundary into a normative one. 
The article on informal eldercare also builds on rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism, in this case to explain women’s choices to give informal care to their 
dependent parents. Lacking information on the respondents’ ideas about work and 
the family, the article includes a series of variables that could be expected to affect 
women’s informal caregiving decisions from a rational choice perspective (e.g., 
employment, health condition, physical distance), and some indicators about cultural 
norms in society (the female labour market participation rate and to what extent 
eldercare is seen as a family responsibility in the country). In a subsequent step, the 
article analyses well-being in relation to work-care decisions and their cultural 
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setting. While rational choice institutionalism does not offer a clear explanation for 
why work-care decisions would impact well-being differently in diverse cultural 
settings, sociological institutionalism does: if societal norms are internalised into the 
person’s own identity, then acting against those norms, and thus against the 
individual’s own moral principles, would create strain within the individual. 
Historical institutionalism adds a temporal element to policy development, arguing 
that existing political institutions affect current decision-making in a process of path 
dependence. Such path dependencies can explain why policy change in many cases 
lags behind cultural change in society, as illustrated in the article on Belgian pension 
policy and poverty among retired women. The article shows that married and 
widowed women, family forms frequently occurring at the time when the Belgian 
pension system matured in the 1950s, are well-protected after retirement. Divorced 
women or women who never married, on the contrary, run a high risk of poverty – 
despite often being more active in the labour market than married or widowed 
women. This stipulates the importance of the institutionalisation of the life course in 
pension research: despite increased labour market participation after separation, the 
damage for their pension build-up is already done due to the cultural norm of quitting 
the labour market when married or pregnant which was widespread at the time. These 
higher poverty rates women face in certain family forms, that are now considered 
normal, could be interpreted as emerging tensions between policies and cultural 
norms, a driver of policy change within historical institutionalism. 
2.2. DEFAMILISATION 
Writing about the role of gender and the family in social policy, the concept of 
defamilisation is hard to negate: much of the debate on the role of women and the 
family in social protection and care evolves around the concept. Despite being 
referred to explicitly in two of the four articles in this dissertation, at no point do I 
critically discuss the concept in the articles. Therefore, I present and discuss different 
ideas about the concept of defamilisation in the literature, and relate the articles to 
these discussions in the conclusion of this section. 
Since its publication, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism has been criticised harshly by feminist scholars for its male-centred 
approach to social policy (Orloff, 2009). In his analyses, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
overlooks the fact that, in male breadwinner societies, the concept of ‘the individual’ 
only refers to male heads of families (Lewis, 1992). As Knijn and Ostner (2002) and 
Blome, Keck, and Alber (2009) point out, the concept of decommodification assumes 
that individuals and their labour are commodified, thereby overlooking women who 
are not active in the labour market, failing to recognise unpaid labour as a source of 
production, and negating the responsibility of the welfare state regarding women’s 
emancipation. Lewis (1992) and O’Connor (1993) indeed argue that many women 
are in fact decommodified: they are not dependent on the market but instead on the 
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family for the provision of welfare. Moreover, decommodification is not as useful a 
concept for analysing social services as it is for social security systems. Therefore, 
feminist scholars launched the term ‘defamilisation’, capturing the extent to which 
the welfare state allows women to be independent of the family. 
There are many different conceptions of what defamilisation exactly means, resulting 
from its inherent complexity: while (de-)commodification refers to the dependence 
of the individual on the labour market, (de-)familisation involves a network of 
(inter)dependencies between family members, shaped by cultural norms and existing 
realities. Defamilisation refers to the extent to which an individual is independent of 
the family for his or her welfare provision. Studies on the concept differ regarding 
the kind of dependencies taken into account (financial or care dependencies) and the 
subjects between whom these dependencies are investigated (dependencies between 
spouses or between parents and their children). In this section, I present a critical 
overview of the concept. 
2.2.1. ECONOMIC VS. SOCIAL DEFAMILISATION 
Defamilialism has been defined by Lister (1997, as quoted in Bambra, 2007, p. 326) 
as ‘the degree to which individual adults can uphold a socially acceptable standard 
of living, independently of family relationships, either through paid work or through 
social security provisions’. This definition focuses solely on financial dependencies 
within the family. In the same vein, Bambra (2007, p. 327) subsequently defines 
defamilisation as ‘the extent to which the welfare state enables women to survive as 
independent workers and decreases the economic importance of the family in 
women’s lives’. Another definition of the concept comes from McLaughlin and 
Glendinning (1994, as quoted in Kröger, 2011, p. 428), labelling ‘those provisions 
and practices which vary the extent to which well-being is dependent on ‘our’ relation 
to the (patriarchal) family’ as ‘de-familisation’. While this definition agrees with the 
previous ones that defamilisation is about managing to live independently from 
family ties, either by maintaining one’s standard of living or by reaching a specific 
level of well-being, the latter is oriented towards care rather than economic 
dependence (Daly, 2011; Kröger, 2011), and does not limit the concept to the relation 
between husband and wife. This last aspect is also stipulated by Leitner and Lessenich 
(2007), drawing also the care receiver – usually children and elderly – into the debate. 
Finally, according to the definition of McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994), 
defamilisation is about ‘the terms and conditions under which individuals engage in 
family life’ (Daly, 2011, p. 6), especially those set by policies. 
Kröger (2011) proposes to separate the issues of economic and care dependence on 
the family, reserving the term ‘defamilisation’ for the former while designating the 
latter as ‘dedomestication’. However, I would argue that both are different 
manifestations of what is fundamentally the same process: the responsibility for 
welfare provision moving away from the family to professional welfare institutions. 
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Moreover, ‘dedomestication’ as a concept suggests that care moves out of the setting 
of the home, negating the transition from institutionalised to professional home care 
taking place in many Western countries (Blome et al., 2009). Therefore, I will follow 
Leitner and Lessenich (2007), using the terms ‘economic’ and ‘social’ defamilisation 
to distinguish between financial and care dependencies, respectively. This distinction 
counters the critique of Saxonberg (2013) that paid leave schemes for care cannot be 
placed in a defamilisation framework, with his understanding of defamilisation being 
very unidimensional: paying individuals to take care of family members is socially 
familial, but economically defamilial (at least on the condition that the benefit is 
sufficient for the carer to sustain an acceptable standard of living). Even though 
Leitner and Lessenich (2007) note that, when relieving women from care tasks, they 
do not necessarily access the labour market – implying that defamilisation of care 
does not necessarily lead to economic defamilisation –, we could argue that the 
opposite is true: women’s economic independence can only be secured on the 
condition that the responsibilities concerning care and home-making that are 
traditionally assigned to them are alleviated (Esping-Andersen, 1999) – paid leave 
schemes for care being a notable exception to a certain degree (Leitner & Lessenich, 
2007). In other words, the policies that are supposed to relieve women (partly) from 
their care obligations, and those enabling women to participate in the labour market, 
are fundamentally the same. This interpretation is in line with the conceptualisation 
and operationalisation of the concept of defamilisation by, for instance, Esping-
Andersen (1999), using indicators such as childcare coverage. 
Esping-Andersen’s (1999) definition of defamilisation allows for the incorporation 
of both financial and care dependencies. The concept ‘capture[s] policies that lessen 
individuals’ reliance on the family; that maximize individuals’ command of 
economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, p. 45). ‘A familialistic welfare regime’, on the contrary, he says, 
‘assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household’. While the reference to 
control over economic resources places the definition in the same stream as Lister 
(1997), the wider statement about the assignment of welfare obligations to the 
household can include both dimensions. We should point out, however, that family 
obligations for welfare provision can reach well beyond the limits of the household: 
familial eldercare, for instance, does not necessarily require the family carer to live 
in the same household. Later on, Esping-Andersen (2009, p. 51) indeed refers to 
familialism as ‘individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship’ rather than on the 
household. 
2.2.2. POLICY VS. CULTURE 
The definitions of Lister (1997), McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) and Esping-
Andersen (1999) also differ in another way: Esping-Andersen (1999) considers 
defamilisation as a characteristic of policies; McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) 
take the wider institutional approach when specifying defamilisation as ‘provisions 
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and practices’, which can refer to both policies and cultural factors; and Lister (1997) 
takes the individual as the starting point, with defamilisation referring to individuals 
having the possibility to have their basic needs fulfilled from sources other than the 
family. The latter definition does not specify which factors can affect this possibility, 
create or limit it, and hence can include both effects of policies and cultures. 
This brings us to the debate on the use of policy characteristics or policy outcomes as 
measures for defamilisation. Despite conceptualising defamilisation in terms of 
policies, many studies operationalise the concept in terms of outcomes (e.g., Ciccia 
& Bleijenbergh, 2014; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008; for a 
good exception, see Javornik, 2014) or welfare spending (e.g., Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 
2014; Hook, 2015; Kleider, 2015). In recent years, authors have increasingly warned 
us that we should measure policies by their characteristics and not their outcomes, 
the core argument being that outcomes are ‘contaminated’: they are not only the result 
of policies but also of cultural norms and their interactions (e.g., Budig, Misra & 
Boeckmann, 2012). Ironically, while both Leitner (2003) and Saxonberg (2013) 
initially warn us about the difference between policies and outcomes, they go on to 
use outcome measurements such as childcare coverage rates in their own 
operationalisations of defamilisation, respectively degenderisation. 
This confusion over what defamilisation exactly entails may be a root cause for why 
different studies disagree on how to classify certain countries. Lewis (1992), for 
instance, brands Ireland and the United Kingdom as ‘strong male breadwinner’ states; 
Leitner (2003) classifies them as ‘defamilial’; and Ciccia and Verloo (2012) place 
the countries in the categories of ‘unsupported universal breadwinner’ and ‘male 
breadwinner’, respectively. Lewis’ (1992) analysis goes well beyond mere policies 
and includes both political and cultural aspects. Ciccia and Verloo (2012) only 
analyse entitlements, and their categorisation of the United Kingdom as ‘male 
breadwinner’ and Ireland as ‘unsupported universal breadwinner’ is not at all visible 
in a key outcome variable such as the employment rate: according to Eurostat (2015), 
56.5 per cent of women aged 15-64 were employed in Ireland and 67.1 per cent in 
the UK in 2014, as compared to 66.9 and 76.8 per cent of men, respectively. 
This separation between policy and culture and their effects on outcomes is a 
fictitious one, a theoretical illusion. It is based on the misconception that we can 
assess policies as good or bad, disregarding the contexts in which they are 
implemented. The cultural context within which a certain policy is implemented is 
not external to the policy; it is a vital component of it. The same policy can be 
introduced for different reasons in different contexts, and as such can have different 
outcomes. Hence, analysing the extent to which policies are ‘familial’ or ‘defamilial’ 
without reference to their outcomes or cultural setting is entirely meaningless. Jensen 
(1996), for instance, illustrates that the principle of equal pay for equal work for men 
and women was introduced in Denmark and Italy for different reasons. While in 
Denmark, egalitarian ideas and stimulating female employment were the objectives 
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of the regulation, the principle was introduced in Italian law with the explicit aim of 
excluding women from the labour market by making female labour more expensive 
and thus less attractive for employers. The introduction of the same principle indeed 
had the desired outcomes in both countries: high female employment in Denmark; 
women’s exclusion from the labour market in Italy. If we were to evaluate gender 
equality in the Danish and Italian labour markets based on policies, we would 
mistakenly conclude that both countries are highly gender equal in this regard: the 
‘real face’ of the Italian policy only reveals itself in its objectives and outcomes. By 
analysing defamilisation solely in terms of the policies themselves and disregarding 
the contexts in which they are implemented and the outcomes they produce, we might 
fall into the same trap. A similar argument is found in Ostner (2010), who points out 
that the context is important to determine whether a policy is really (de-)familialist. 
She refers for instance to the development of parental leave in Germany, which would 
be considered explicit familialism at face-value, but in fact aims to strengthen 
women’s ties with the labour market and to shorten the periods of leave they would 
take after childbirth. Hence, the introduction of what looks like an explicitly 
familialistic scheme is in fact a step towards reduced familialism. At the same time, 
the introduction of parental leave schemes in Hungary had the opposite effect and 
turned women into a ‘reserve army of labourers’ (Fodor & Kispeter, 2014). Hence, 
analysing familialism in policies without taking the cultural setting into account is 
not only meaningless, it might also lead to the wrong conclusions. 
Especially regarding care, culture can be a strong moderator for how policies impact 
outcomes. Pfau-Effinger (2011) illustrates this with a comparison of satisfaction of 
mothers of young children with their role as mothers. Despite similar employment 
rates among women with children below three years of age, Finnish mothers of young 
children are more satisfied with their primary role as a mother than are their Spanish 
counterparts. The author shows that this is likely related to their different cultural 
values and ideas about motherhood. 
2.2.3. IMPLICIT VS. EXPLICIT FAMILIALISM – AND THE NORMATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
The link between cultural norms and policies becomes especially prevalent when 
discussing implicit and explicit familialism, as these concepts reflect different 
objectives of policy-makers (and thus their normative frameworks) and effects of 
policies on society. Explicit familialism refers to a situation where governments 
explicitly place responsibilities with the family; implicit familialism occurs when 
governments do not intervene in a certain field and leave the initiative to private 
persons or institutions (Javornik 2014; Leitner 2003). A government not supplying 
or subsidising professional childcare, for instance, is implicitly familialist as it leaves 
parents with no other option but to resort to family care if they cannot afford market 
care. Explicit familialism can be linked with conservative ideas about the family and 
the distribution of tasks within it, while implicit familialism is rather the consequence 
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of a liberal point of view on private initiative and minimal state intervention – or 
familialism as austerity. Defamilisation, to the contrary, is traditionally linked with 
the social-democratic welfare regimes (Blome et al., 2009; Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
When combining the distinction between explicit and implicit familialism and 
defamilialism with the social/economic familialism dichotomy, however, classifying 
policies as explicit or implicit familialism or defamilialism becomes a rather complex 
exercise.  The social and economic dimensions do not fall into the same category in 
any of the welfare policies listed in Table 2-1. Moreover, in at least two cases it is 
not possible to categorise one of the components as explicit or implicit familialism, 
or defamilialism, without an understanding of the cultural setting within which a 
policy is introduced. Professional care services take care responsibilities away from 
the family and are therefore socially defamilialising, but do not necessarily lead to 
economic defamilisation: for example, childcare services were originally introduced 
in Spain as an educational measure and not for care relief for the family (Escobedo, 
1999). Low social benefits, on the other hand, are considered implicit familialism as 
they force individuals to be dependent economically on the people around them, but 
whether low replacement incomes push women into paid work (as economic theory 
would suggest) or into becoming a homemaker and taking up informal care tasks may 
well depend on the broader cultural context. From this, we can draw two conclusions: 
first, that branding policies as a whole as implicitly or explicitly familial or defamilial 
is not feasible as it would involve a very unidimensional view on policies; and 
second, policies may have very different outcomes in terms of familialism dependent 
on the context in which they are implemented. 
Table 2-1 Explicit and implicit familialism and defamilialism in the social and economic 
components of welfare policies 
 Social Economic 
Paid care leave Explicit 
Familial 
Defamilial 
Unpaid care leave Explicit 
Familial 
Implicit 
Familial 
Professional care services Defamilial 
 
? 
Low social benefits ? Implicit 
Familial 
Social benefits with 
family rate 
Implicit 
Familial 
Explicit 
Familial 
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2.2.4. BACK TO THE ROOTS: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF 
DEFAMILISATION 
So far I have concluded that defamilisation refers to the degree to which individuals 
are independent of the family for welfare provision, which can entail both financial 
and care dependencies; that ‘defamilisation’ is a complex and multidimensional 
concept; and that marking policies as familial or defamilial is only possible with 
reference to the cultural context and meaningful in light of their outcomes. The aim 
of this section is to give a more precise answer to the question of what defamilisation 
exactly entails, and to answer that question I go ‘back to the roots’. 
In Figure 2-1, I present a figure based on Pestoff’s (1992, p. 25) illustration of the 
‘welfare mix’. The three main suppliers of welfare – state, market and the family – 
can be distinguished from one another by three division lines: formal (state and 
market) vs. informal (family); public (state) vs. private (market and family); and for-
profit (market) vs. non-profit (state and family).12 Esping-Andersen’s (1990) concept 
of decommodification essentially refers to a transition from for-profit to non-profit 
welfare supply, as it refers to the extent to which an individual can maintain an 
acceptable standard of living independent of the market. While Esping-Andersen 
originally considered the concept in a context of social security, and thus as a 
transition from market to state supply of income, feminist researchers pointed out that 
welfare provision can also be decommodified by transferring it from the market to 
the family. This is the case for many women who are not in paid work nor receive 
public support, but are instead supported by their husbands’ income (Knijn & Ostner, 
2002; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 2009). A second transition, austerity, moves welfare 
supply from the public to the private sphere, pushing state responsibilities towards 
families or markets. Following the same logic, then, defamilisation is a transition 
from informal to formal welfare supply, thus, from family to state or market provided 
welfare. 
                                                          
12 Normally, the third sector, consisting of non-profit organisations, is also included in the 
figure and is situated in the gap in the middle (non-profit, private and formal). However, I did 
not include the third sector in Figure 2-1 as it does not appear in any of the four articles included 
in this PhD. 
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Figure 2-1 Defamilisation in context 
If we take the insight that defamilisation is a transition from informal to formal 
welfare supply as the starting point, then this automatically means that the concept 
refers to outcomes reached in terms of who actually supplies the welfare, and not just 
to the policies present in a certain country. Such a focus necessarily means taking 
into account different factors that contribute to the existence of a certain welfare mix, 
and thus analysing both policies and the cultural context within which they emerge 
and through which they affect society. Analytically, this implies going back to the 
initial way of analysing the family’s role in social policy as found, for instance, in 
Lewis’ (1992) article: an encompassing case-by-case analysis of policies and cultural 
factors, and how this mixture leads to specific outcomes. A contemporary illustration 
can be found in Hook’s (2015) study showing that the effect of social policies on 
female employment is dependent on class, especially in Anglo-Saxon and Mediter-
ranean welfare states, which can be the result of both financial considerations (not 
being able to afford childcare) and cultural differences between social classes (e.g., 
high-educated women being more career-oriented). 
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2.2.5. DEFAMILISATION, DEGENDERISATION OR 
INDIVIDUALISATION? 
Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) argue that the concept of defamilisation cannot 
distinguish maternity and paternity leave, despite their very different outcomes in 
terms of gender equality. That critique is entirely correct, and indeed points to the 
need for an analysis in terms of gender. A major problem of the concept of 
defamilisation, however, is that it is used to tackle two different issues at the same 
time: the extent to which the family is relied on for the supply of welfare, and the 
gendered distribution of labour (within the family and beyond). In line with my 
conception of defamilisation as outlined above, referring to a transfer of welfare 
responsibilities away from the family, the concept should not refer to the very related 
though fundamentally different issues of gender equality and the gendered division 
of labour. I would propose reserving the concept of defamilisation strictly for the 
former, and using Saxonberg’s (2013) concept of ‘degenderisation’ to refer to the 
latter. Even though both concepts are strongly intertwined, I would argue for keeping 
defamilisation and degenderisation strictly separated: while defamilisation is about 
the unit providing welfare, degenderisation is about gender roles and hence about 
gender distributions within these units. 
The benefit of separating both concepts is illustrated in Table 2-2, where the welfare 
state typology presented in Ciccia and Verloo (2012) is divided by whether the 
prototypical models are gendered or degendered, and familial or defamilial. The male 
breadwinner model has a strongly gendered division of labour and is highly familial; 
the caregiver parity model also considers a gendered division of labour and family 
care (social familialism), but supports carers with an income (economically 
defamilial); the universal caregiver model, Fraser’s (1994) political ideal, on the other 
hand, is degendered though at the same time gives (limited) care responsibilities to 
the family, resulting in partial social and economic defamilisation; finally, the 
universal breadwinner is highly defamilial in terms of taking care responsibilities 
away from the family and having both men and women in the labour market, though 
such a formalisation does not necessarily involve degenderisation of care work. 
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Table 2-2 The typology by Ciccia and Verloo (2012) based on Fraser (1994), when 
defamilisation and degenderisation are separated 
 Familial Defamilial 
Gendered Male 
breadwinner 
 
Caregiver parity 
(soc. fam.; econ. 
defam.) 
 
Universal 
breadwinner 
 
Degendered  Universal caregiver 
(partial soc. and econ. 
defam.) 
 
 
The concept of degenderisation should not be limited to the family sphere alone, but 
it should tackle gender equality and the gendered distribution of labour in welfare 
provision in general – that is, within the family, the market, and the state. Gender 
roles, and hence degenderisation, are part of the cultural context within which welfare 
is provided (see Figure 2-1), and thus it affects both the relation between the three 
different spheres of welfare provision and the welfare provision within each sphere. 
If the goal of degenderisation indeed is ‘to eliminate gender roles’ (Saxonberg, 2013, 
p. 32), then merely lifting family responsibilities will not do. That would only shift 
the gendered division of labour from unpaid to paid labour, as is the case at the 
moment with care still largely being a women’s task: the Scandinavian countries are 
not only at the top in terms of female employment, they also have the highest 
occupational gender segregation in the world (Jarman, Blackburn & Racko, 2012; 
Kremer, 2007, p. 48). Even though the proposed separation of defamilisation and 
degenderisation might be read as a confirmation of Mary Daly’s (2011, p. 2) 
statement that ‘as family policy has come to the fore, gender has been cast in the 
shade’, I would argue that the proposed conception of defamilisation is not ‘gender 
blind’: defamilisation is a gendered process, as is decommodification (Bolzendahl, 
2010). 
On a final note, Daly (2011) criticises the use of the term ‘defamilisation’, because it 
suggests the transition merely is one of responsibilities moving from the family to the 
state, disregarding changes of the family itself. However, this critique is the result of 
her interpretation of defamilisation as policies, overlooking the cultural element it 
entails (supra). Following León (2002), Daly (2011) proposes contrasting 
familisation and individualisation instead of the ‘familisation-defamilisation’ 
dichotomy. This coincides with Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s (2002) notion of 
‘institutionalised individualism’, whereby institutions such as the welfare state focus 
more and more on provision for the individual rather than the group, in this case the 
family. Indeed, defamilisation is an individualisation process, on the condition that it 
creates alternative options the individual can choose from. However, following Pfau-
Effinger’s (2005; 2012) idea of ‘welfare culture’, Lewis (2006) argues that if policies 
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are optional, people are likely to act in accordance with gender culture, meaning that 
choice is still not entirely free. She suggests the incentives to steer individuals 
towards a more gender-equal division of care work (e.g., via ‘daddy months’). Hence, 
Pascall and Lewis (2004, p. 390-391) argue that care and individualism can only go 
together in ‘[a]n inclusive citizenship version of the dual earner-dual carer model’ in 
which ‘[s]ocial policies would assume that men and women equally need to earn for 
their own security and should have equal obligation to care for children and others’ 
– in other words, when incomes are equal and individual, and care is equally shared.  
2.2.6. DEFAMILISATION, LIFE COURSES AND FAMILY MODELS 
The family is an important unit in the organisation of life courses (Krüger & Levy, 
2001). Family life comes with mutual normative obligations that are typically 
gendered, rendering gendered life courses (Moen, 2011). While men’s life courses 
are more homogeneous and work-centred, those of women are more complex and 
reflect the decisions regarding work and care women make throughout their active 
age years. Due to men’s cumulative advantages by being able to focus on their 
careers, and the cumulative disadvantages for women when they decide to focus on 
family care, a ‘network’ of mutual dependencies is generated (Harrington Meyer & 
Parker, 2010), which is reflected by the life course concept of ‘linked lives’. 
One downside of the concept of defamilisation is that it focuses on specific policy 
fields, and hence cannot account for the full network of dependencies in a family, nor 
for how disadvantages are accumulated throughout life over these different fields. An 
approach in terms of family models, mapping cultural and policy-induced dependen-
cies within and across generations, can offer a solution. 
Lewis (2001) discusses how societies slowly move away from the male breadwinner 
model, which she describes as ‘based on a set of assumptions about male and female 
contributions at the household level: men having the primary responsibility to earn 
and women to care for the young and the old. Female dependence was inscribed in 
the model’ (p. 153). As a well-established norm in society, the male breadwinner 
model became engrained in social and family policies. As cultural norms changed in 
society and women became more work-oriented, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands tried to shift from a male breadwinner to an adult worker – or universal 
breadwinner (Fraser, 1994) or dual breadwinner (Montanari, 2009) – model as the 
basis for their policies (Lewis, 2001). Later, the adult worker model also became the 
main goal of the European Union’s female employment agenda (Lewis, 2006). 
Unfortunately, the model is only concerned with women being in paid employment 
and overlooks the gendered division of unpaid care work (Lewis, 2006), resulting in 
a de facto ‘one-and-a-half earner’ model in which the husband works fulltime and the 
wife part-time, while policies ‘increasingly tend to assume full individualization’ 
(Lewis, 2001, p. 154). Also Duncan et al. (2003) criticise the adult worker model for 
assuming full individualism and actors based on an economic rationality, overlooking 
THE FAMILY AS PROVIDER OF WELFARE 
34
 
norms, moral rationality and the negotiation of care work between partners. I would 
argue that the fundamental problem of the adult worker model is that it only considers 
one type of dependency – that of women on their husbands – and disregards the wider 
intergenerational network of dependencies that are connected to it. 
The consensus is that the dual worker-dual carer model, whereby both partners are 
equally involved in the labour market and equally involved in unpaid care work is 
the ideal we have to strive for, yet is unattainable in the near future due to the 
remaining cultural norm of the gendered division of care work (Duncan et al., 2003; 
Fraser, 1994; Lewis, 2001). 
2.2.7. CONCLUSION 
There is much debate about what the concept of defamilisation exactly entails. 
Fundamentally, there is an agreement that defamilisation refers to the extent to which 
individuals are dependent on their family members for their well-being. However, 
there is much debate on the nature of this dependence. Does it refer to financial or 
care dependence? Does it only include dependencies generated by policies, or should 
it also refer to cultural dependencies? Moreover, family dependencies generated by 
policies can be both implicit and explicit. Parallel to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
concept of decommodification entailing independence from the market, I propose a 
wide interpretation of defamilisation, referring to the degree of independence from 
the family for the individual’s welfare and well-being. That means that policies 
should be evaluated by their outcomes in their respective (cultural) settings, rather 
than by some generic aspects of the policies themselves. I do, however, note that, 
while defamilisation might be an interesting tool to evaluate specific policies, family 
models are preferable when analysing family dependencies within a welfare state 
over the full life course. 
The different articles in this dissertation refer to different aspects of defamilisation. 
Explicit familialism is very prominent in the Belgian pension system, as is 
exemplified in the article on poverty among retired women in Belgium. The state 
explicitly makes women dependent on their husbands, for instance by denying 
married women their own pension payments if their build-up is below a certain limit, 
and instead paying the husband a higher pension for having a dependent spouse. The 
Belgian pension system arguably contains certain aspects of implicit familialism as 
well, for instance by having a guaranteed income (a social assistance scheme 
specifically for the retired) well below the poverty line, making individuals with 
insufficient pension rights, typically women who are divorced or never married, 
dependent on the people around them. 
The articles on childcare and eldercare, both referring to defamilisation or familialism 
in the text, can be placed within the discussion on whether the concept should refer 
to policies or outcomes – and the position of culture therein. The article on opinions 
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towards childcare creates clusters of welfare states based on outcomes such as female 
employment and childcare coverage rates. Moreover, the article on informal 
eldercare looks at outcomes as a dependent variable – rather literally, as it refers to 
the dependence of older individuals on their daughters to receive care –, and stipulates 
the importance of cultural norms in society to explain these outcomes. The clear 
importance of cultural variables on outcomes illustrates that policies should not be 
evaluated in a social vacuum, as some would suggest by critiquing an outcome-
measurement of defamilisation, but instead that one should evaluate the policies in 
terms of their success within a specific cultural setting – that is, in terms of outcomes. 
Finally, the article on retirement preferences does not deal with issues of dependence 
on the family, but it does show unequal treatment of men and women in retirement 
policies. As such, it helps to distinguish between the concepts of defamilisation and 
degenderisation. Gender-specific retirement ages are gendered policies, and hence 
the process of equalising retirement ages of men and women taking place in most 
Western European countries is a case of degenderisation. However, on the condition 
that women’s pensions are sufficient to maintain one’s standard of living, differences 
in official retirement ages do not necessarily make women dependent on their 
husbands, and therefore the equalisation of retirement ages is not a case of 
defamilisation. 
The four articles illustrate the different aspects of the concept of defamilisation, as 
well as its limits. Belgian pension regulations are a case of explicit economic 
familialism, with benefits dependent on your current and past family situation. 
Moreover, by keeping large groups of women in poverty as a result of previous life 
events, the pension system arguably has some traits of implicit familialism as well, 
as these women likely need financial support from the people around them. The paper 
on eldercare is an example of social familialism and demonstrates the effect of 
familialist norms on women’s behaviour and its consequences, providing evidence 
of the strong cultural impact on the level of familial support. This strengthens my 
conviction that we should conceive familialism and defamilisation in terms of 
outcomes, accounting for both policies and cultural norms, as much of the effect of 
policies is dependent on these norms. Finally, the paper on retirement preferences 
can illustrate the boundary between defamilisation and degenderisation. While most 
post-communist countries still have a gender difference in retirement ages, Western 
European countries have ‘degenderised’ their retirement ages and closed the gap 
between the retirement ages for men and women over the years – the United Kingdom 
being a notable exception. Even though this is a clear case of degenderisation, this 
transition has little to do with dependence on the family, being the core of 
defamilisation. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
All four papers included in this dissertation rely on quantitative analysis of different 
data sources, both survey and register data. In this section, I assume a basic 
understanding of linear regression and elaborate on two specific deviations from the 
simple linear regression (i.e., ordinary least squares regression) model. First, 
multilevel analysis is a useful technique when one wants to know whether macro-
level contexts affect individuals, and hence is a logical methodological choice in this 
dissertation focusing on how cultural values and policies in a country affect 
individuals’ ideas and actions. Second, logistic regression is used in the case of a 
binary dependent variable. Here, it is used in the article on pension outcomes, 
assessing which women are poor and which are not depending on their life courses 
and the pension regulations in Belgium. After a brief discussion on these methods, 
their advantages and their disadvantages, I make some critical remarks about how the 
methods have been used in the different articles. 
3.1. MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
Three articles in this dissertation deal with individuals from several countries (the 
articles on childcare opinions, retirement preferences and informal eldercare). As 
their dependent variables are (quasi-)interval scaled, linear regression is the logical 
choice. However, because the respondents live in certain countries, the assumption 
of independence of the error terms made in simple linear regression is not respected 
(Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 55). The dependence 
of error terms increases the probability of Type I error (Hox, 2002; Kreft & de 
Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004), meaning an increased risk of rejecting the null hypothesis 
of the absence of an effect when it is actually true (i.e., a ‘false positive’). Multilevel 
analysis overcomes this problem by accounting for the hierarchical structure of the 
data and splitting the error term into between-country error and within-country 
variance (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004). 
The level of dependence of the error terms is indicated by the intra-class correlation 
coefficient, which is calculated in an empty or intercept-only model, that is, a model 
without variables on either level (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). It shows to what extent 
total variance in the dependent variable is attributable to differences between higher-
level units (countries, in the studies included here): 
The intra-class correlation is a measure of the degree of dependence of 
individuals. The more individuals share common experiences due to 
closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or to a certain 
extent, duplications of each other. (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998, p. 9) 
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Apart from statistical (the assumption of independent error terms) and empirical 
reasons to apply multilevel analysis (the intra-class correlation coefficient), Luke 
(2004) also refers to theoretical reasons to apply this technique: if the theoretical 
model used in the research refers to mechanisms working at different levels of 
analysis, then the multilevel analysis is required. That is indeed the case in all three 
studies in this dissertation including multilevel analysis: they hypothesise that macro-
level institutions (both policies and cultural factors) impact opinions, preferences and 
actions of individuals.13 
Multilevel analysis can refer to both random intercept models and random slope 
models. A random intercept model with one independent variable has the following 
form in the micro-part of the equation (Gill & Womack, 2013): 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
The outcome variable y for the ith case of the jth group14 equals the intercept for the jth 
group (𝛽0𝑗), plus the value that i
th case of the jth group has on the independent variable 
x multiplied by a coefficient (𝛽1) and some error (𝜀𝑖𝑗). From this model, it is clear 
that the coefficient for variable x (𝛽1) is the same for all groups in the regression – 
and hence is fixed –, while the intercept (𝛽0𝑗) is specific to the group – meaning that 
it consists of a fixed component (i.e., the mean intercept) and a random component 
(i.e., the group’s deviance from this mean) (Gill & Womack, 2013): 
𝛽0𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑗 
In this macro equation, 𝛽0 is the mean intercept (the fixed component) and 𝑢0𝑗 is the 
group-specific error (the random component or the deviance from the mean). Just like 
in normal regression, error is assumed to follow a normal distribution, meaning that 
the group-specific intercepts should be normally distributed around the mean 
intercept (Gill & Womack, 2013; Hox, 2002). It is this error distribution in country-
intercepts that can be explained by adding country-level variables to the model.15 In 
                                                          
13 There are alternative research designs allowing for the assessment of differences between 
countries, such as comparative case studies of just a few countries. However, as countries 
consist of a complex mix of political (state) and cultural (society) institutions, they tend to 
differ on more than one or just a few aspects, making it difficult to argue that observed 
differences between countries are the result of particular norms or policies. As multilevel 
analysis allows for the inclusion of and control for multiple variables, it is more suitable to 
pinpoint which policies and/or norms are responsible for a particular outcome. 
14 ‘Case’ refers to the micro-level, here the individual; ‘group’ refers to the macro-level, here 
the country. 
15 Note that also individual-level variables can affect country-level variance (infra). 
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sum, the random intercept means the expectation that the outcome variable differs 
across countries and allows us to model individual-level outcomes using country-
level variables (Luke, 2004). 
In the papers included in the dissertation, I limit myself to random intercept models, 
meaning that the intercept is random but the regression coefficients are fixed. As 
such, I assume that individual-level variables have the same impact on the dependent 
variable in all countries (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004). This approach might 
be especially problematic for one particular variable (‘filial care’) in the paper on 
informal eldercare. In the paper, I include some cross-level interaction terms, 
meaning interactions between variables at the individual level and variables at the 
country-level (i.e., the interaction between filial care on the one hand and female 
labour market participation and eldercare norms in society on the other). While the 
paper treats all regression coefficients as fixed effects, the inclusion of interaction 
terms in fact means that the slope of the caregiving variable is dependent on the 
context. Therefore, I should include filial care as a random rather than a fixed effect 
in the regression. This coincides with Hox’s (2002) stepwise multilevel model 
construction, whereby cross-level interaction terms are only added to the model after 
the individual-level variable concerned is included as a random effect. Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal (2008, p. 61), on the other hand, argue that it is only relevant to include 
random effects when the higher-level units are randomly selected and it is the aim of 
the study to generalise results to a wider population of these units. That is not the case 
here, as will be discussed later in this section. 
As the total variance is split into individual and country level variance, a simple R2 
measure is not an indicator of explained variance in multilevel analysis. Therefore, 
different methods are used to compare the goodness of fit of different models. Based 
on maximum likelihood estimation, deviance (i.e., -2 log likelihood) is a core 
measure of model fit in multilevel analysis (Hox, 2002). The measure indicates to 
what extent there is a ‘lack of fit between the data and the model’ (Luke, 2004, p. 
34). Even though the measure in itself cannot be interpreted, it can be used to compare 
the performance of nested models in a fixed sample (Hox, 2002). However, much 
like with R2, the deviance measure will indicate a better fit when variables are added 
to the model, no matter how well they predict the dependent variable, conflicting with 
the principle of parsimony. Hence, derived measures such as the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) add a ‘penalty’ to the deviance for every variable included: it simply 
adds double the number of parameters used in the model to the deviance statistic 
(Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). 
Also pseudo-R2 measures have been developed to compare goodness of fit of 
multilevel models, giving one R2 measure for the lower level and another one for the 
higher level of analysis (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). These pseudo-R2 measures 
represent the ‘proportional reduction’ in total error variance for each level of analysis 
(Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 102-104). I use such a measure in the paper on 
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opinions towards government support for childcare for working parents. Though 
these measures ‘mimic’ the normal R2 in ordinary linear regression, they are not 
entirely the same and run the risk of underestimating the variance explained or even 
yielding negative results (Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004) because higher level variance can 
not only decrease, but also increase, when variables at the lower level are added to 
the model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 104). Indeed, in some of the models 
including only individual-level variables, the R2 measure for the country level is 
slightly below zero. Therefore, such R2 measures should only be interpreted in terms 
of reduction of error and used for the comparison of models, and not be interpreted 
in terms of explained variance (Luke, 2004). 
The relation between lower level variables and higher level variance leads to a 
supplementary problem. If important country-level variables are not controlled for, a 
situation of omitted variable bias or endogeneity can occur when these omitted 
variables are correlated with individual-level variables. In this case, the individual-
level variables become correlated with the country-level error terms, which can lead 
to a misspecification of the effects of the lower-level variables (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2008, p. 114-115). This problem can be solved by splitting the lower-level 
variable into two: one containing the country-means of the individual-level variable, 
and a second one where the individual-level variable within every country is centred 
around this country-average (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008, p. 115). Because the 
individual-level variable is split up into a country-level and an individual-level 
variable, the latter is uncorrelated with the error term at the country level, solving the 
specification problem. Unfortunately, I did not know about this problem, as studies 
in the field of social policy applying multilevel analysis techniques tend to not pay 
attention to this problem either. A control of the well-being analyses in the paper on 
eldercare indicates that most coefficients are not affected by omitted variable bias, 
though that there might be a problem with the dummy variable on high intensity 
caregiving. I will explore this further in the review process of the paper. 
To conclude this section on multilevel analysis, I have two reflections regarding the 
aggregate level. First, the countries in the analyses are not randomly selected, 
meaning that the error terms at the higher level are not really random. This poses 
important questions regarding the generalisability of the effects of country-level 
variables found in the different articles. First, only European countries are included, 
implying that any generalisation beyond the European borders would be ‘walking on 
thin ice’. A generalisation from the selection of countries included to all of Europe is 
less problematic, but would involve the assumption that countries’ decisions to 
participate in these international survey programmes such as the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
are unrelated to the variables included in the analysis. The second reflection is more 
fundamental in nature, and is related to the place of culture within the hierarchical 
data structure. By placing cultural variables at the macro-level, it is assumed that 
norms are in fact homogeneous in society, denying the variation of norms existing in 
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society. However, as there are no clearly defined and delineated cultural groups to 
which individuals belong, it is not possible to include cultural groups in the 
hierarchical model in between the individual and the country-level. Hence, even if 
there are good theoretical reasons to consider culture as a factor at the meso-level, it 
is not possible to operationalise it as such. 
3.2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
In the article on poverty among retired women in Belgium, the dependent variable in 
the study is whether women are poor or not, a categorical variable with two 
categories: poor and not poor. As there are only two possible answer categories, the 
assumption of normally distributed error terms made in linear regression is not 
respected (Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant, 2013, p. 7; Menard, 2002; Mood, 
2010). Therefore, linear regression will not render optimal estimations of individuals’ 
probabilities of being in poverty. Moreover, linear regression assumes a constant 
increase in the probability of the dependent variable per unit increase in the 
independent variable, while these probability distributions are non-linear: there are 
‘floor’ and ‘ceiling effects’, meaning that the probability curve bends off so as to 
approach zero, respectively one, but not to cross it (Agresti, 2010, p. 5; Kleinbaum 
& Klein, 2010, p. 6; Pampel, 2000). By neglecting the floor and ceiling effects, linear 
regression can render impossible results, whereby individuals are assigned a 
predicted probability outside the range of zero and one (Harrell, 2001, p. 215-216; 
Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010, p. 5-6; Menard, 2002; Mood, 2010; Pampel, 2000). 
Moreover, linear regression on a binary dependent variable (i.e., a linear probability 
modelling) breaches the assumption of homoscedasticity in linear regression, leading 
to less precise estimates (Menard, 2002; Mood, 2010). Logistic regression 
circumvents these problems. 
Instead of using the real values, 1 for ‘poor’ and 0 for ‘not poor’, the method relies 
on the probability of being poor for an individual with certain characteristics (e.g., 
0.6 if six out of ten individuals at a certain age are in poverty). As the resulting line 
of probabilities is not linear, it cannot be estimated in a regression – linearity being 
another assumption in regression. Hence, the dependent variable is transformed twice 
in order to make it linear: first, probabilities are turned into odds, which have an 
exponential function; and then we take the natural logarithm of the odds so as to 
transform the exponential into a linear function (Menard, 2002; Pampel, 2000). 
Hence, in logistic regression, the log of the odds of the dependent variable is 
calculated. If the regression coefficients (logit coefficients) are negative, an increase 
in the independent variable coincides with a decrease in probabilities on the 
dependent variable; positive logit coefficients mean that probabilities increase with a 
higher value on the independent variable. However, the interpretation of the values 
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of logit coefficients is not straightforward, which is why I prefer to indicate the size 
of an effect by calculating the probabilities for a number of specific type-cases.16 
As binary dependent variables are not normally distributed, variance-based indicators 
for the goodness of fit such as the explained variance (R2) used in linear regression 
do not apply to logistic regression. For a comparison of the goodness of fit of nested 
logistic regression models, we can use the -2 log likelihood score or derived measures 
such as the AIC (Menard, 2002) – the lower the -2 log likelihood or the AIC, the 
better. The latter promotes parsimony by penalising for adding extra variables in the 
model (Agresti, 2007, p. 141-142). Hence, the improvement in -2 log likelihood for 
adding an extra variable to the model should be big enough to compensate for the 
penalty of adding the extra variable. 
Logistic regression, however, has a problem of ‘unobserved heterogeneity’, meaning 
that coefficients are not only affected by the effect of their respective independent 
variables on the outcome variable, but also by the ‘unobserved’ variables that are not 
included in the model (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010; Williams, 2009). Therefore, 
comparing effects over different models or different samples is not as straightforward 
as it is in linear regression. In logistic regression, a standard logistic distribution is 
assumed, meaning that the unexplained variance (i.e., the equivalent of the error term 
in linear regression) is fixed (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010). As a result, when the 
explained variance of the model increases due to adding relevant variables, the total 
variance of the dependent variable is forced to increase by adapting its scale. By 
adapting the scale of the dependent variable, the coefficients of the independent 
variables in the model also have to change (Mood, 2010). In Mood’s (2010, p. 69) 
words, ‘we standardise the true coefficients β1 so that the residuals can have the 
variance of the standard logistic distribution’. Hence, the scale of the dependent 
variable, and therefore the size of the coefficients, are dependent on the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model. 
The question remains how we can compare logit effect sizes over different models or 
samples despite the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. First, as far as explaining 
effects away through the inclusion of new variables is concerned, unobserved 
heterogeneity is not a problem because the problem makes us underestimate effect 
sizes: ‘even if we do not know the size of the impact of unobserved heterogeneity 
(…), we always know the direction of the impact: it can only lead to an 
underestimation of the effect’ (Mood, 2010, p. 72, emphasis in original). Further, 
Mood (2010) proposes some solutions in order to be able to compare effects across 
samples and models. In the paper on poverty among retired women in Belgium, we 
                                                          
16 There are also other methods to express the size of an effect, such as marginal average 
effects. However, I prefer the type-cases as they make the results more ‘tangible’: it makes it 
easier to understand the exact impact a variable on average has in a concrete situation. 
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use three methods with a focus on comparison between samples, as differences 
between women depending on their marital status is the core of what the paper is 
about: ‘Allison’s procedure’ (comparing between samples), heterogeneous choice 
models (comparing between samples) and linear probability models (comparing 
between samples and models). As the latter refers to applying simple linear regression 
to a binary dependent variable (for a defence of linear probability models, see 
Hellevik, 2009), these problems of unobserved heterogeneity that are specific to 
logistic regression do not apply. 
Regarding the comparison of coefficients across samples for a specific model, 
unobserved heterogeneity is only problematic if the unobserved heterogeneity is 
bigger for one group than for another – when certain omitted variables have a stronger 
impact on the dependent variable in certain samples than in others (Williams, 2009). 
Allison (1999) tries to overcome this problem by adjusting for unequal residual 
variation (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity) through the comparison of the sum of the 
log likelihoods of the model in the separate samples with that of one model for the 
total sample and a dummy variable distinguishing the separate groups.17 The author 
supplies a SAS macro (glogit) that produces these adjusted results and compares them 
across the different samples. In the paper, we make use of this macro to compare the 
coefficients across models. According to Williams (2009), however, Allison’s 
approach potentially leads to wrong conclusions and an underestimation of 
differences between groups. The problem, according to Williams (2009), is that 
Allison’s method to adjust coefficients for unobserved heterogeneity requires the 
assumption that at least one coefficient in the model is the same in all samples for the 
procedure. Heterogeneous choice models, Williams (2009) states, do not require this 
assumption and simply allow for the inclusion of interaction terms between the 
grouping variable and the variables in the model to assess the difference in effect 
sizes between samples. Following Williams (2009), we use the user-written STATA 
command oglm (ordinal generalised linear models) to perform these tests. 
In the paper on informal eldercare, I apply logistic regression for a dependent variable 
with three categories: ‘does not give care’, ‘gives care up to twice a week’, and ‘gives 
care more than twice a week’. However, the dependent variable is not nominal but 
ordinal, so an ordinal or ‘cumulative’ logit model (Agresti, 2007, p. 180; 2010) could 
have yielded more precise results in terms of significance, as it would take into 
account the ordinal structure of the variable. Moreover, because not all data are taken 
into account simultaneously, the samples differ from model to model, which renders 
comparison between models in terms of goodness of fit indicators such as AIC 
impossible. I run binary logistic regressions, each comparing two response 
categories, as I thought ordinal logistic regression would be rather complicated given 
                                                          
17 Williams (2009, p. 535-536) presents a brief and clear summary of Allison’s (1999) 
procedure. 
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the multilevel structure of the data. Based on these problems, however, I am planning 
to apply a different analysis technique based on Agresti’s (2010, p. 282-288) 
discussion of ordinal generalised liner mixed models when adapting the paper during 
the review process. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
I started this dissertation by asking: ‘How are opinions, preferences and actions 
related to women’s conditions and their roles in social policy throughout the life 
course?’ In order to connect opinions, preferences, actions and conditions or 
outcomes in relation to social policies, I gave a brief overview of rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalism and their respective logics of calculation, 
appropriateness and path dependence. Subsequently, I discussed the concept of 
‘defamilisation’, around which the debate on the position of the woman in social 
policy evolves. Then I briefly presented the methods used in the four papers. In this 
concluding chapter, I relate the articles back to the theoretical framework. 
I discussed the problem of what opinions exactly are within institutionalist theory, 
and the consequences it has for studying opinions. Within a rational choice 
framework, opinions are only relevant as far as they reflect concrete preferences for 
actions. In this case, welfare opinions reflect the self-interest of a utility-maximising 
individual, meaning that they can be influenced by whether the individual would 
benefit from the specific welfare scheme. From a sociological institutionalist 
perspective, opinions could reflect both mental models, being sets of internalised 
norms and ideas, or preferences. However, their positioning as either reflections of 
mental models or preferences have contradictory consequences within the theory. If 
opinions are reflections of mental models, then we can expect cultural variables in 
society to affect them. However, that would also mean that it would be meaningless 
to explain the opinions with other opinions, because they are both part of the same 
mental models and hence cannot have a causal relationship – at best a correlating one. 
Alternatively, opinions are preferences, in which case it would make sense to explain 
them with other variables reflecting mental models, such as variables containing 
aspects of ideologies. In this case, however, we cannot use cultural variables as 
explanatory variables in the model, as cultural norms only affect preferences through 
internalisation into the individual’s mental models. In sum, based on theoretical 
considerations, one can either classify opinions as mental models and explain them 
with variables referring to cultural norms in society, or consider them as preferences 
in which case ideology and self-interest can be used as explanatory variables. 
In the paper dealing with opinions, Do self-interest, ideology and national context 
influence opinions on government support for childcare for working parents? A 
multilevel analysis, little evidence is found for rational choice explanations of 
opinions and, even though it performs better, the ideology hypothesis is not 
particularly good at explaining whether individuals want the government to support 
childcare services for working parents. Though variation at the country-level is 
limited, country-level explanations such as the cultural effects hypothesis reveal 
much more important effects. 
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I see three possible answers for why both culture on the one hand and ideology and 
rational choice explanations on the other can affect opinions simultaneously. First, 
‘opinions’ are a hybrid concept and consist of both elements of mental models and 
preferences. We can include elements of both into the question used in the article. 
The question may refer to individuals’ fundamental ideas about the role of the state 
and the family, for instance the explicit reference to the government support only 
applying to working parents brings an element of self-interest and thus preference 
into the question. A second possible explanation could be desirability response bias, 
in which the respondent answers the question in line with what he or she thinks is a 
‘good’ answer for the country, rather than giving his or her own opinion. That could 
explain why cultural effects remain despite controlling for the individual’s world 
views. However, if this were the case, it is hard to see why the other variables related 
to the individual’s ideology were not affected by the same bias. A third explanation 
for why cultural effects remain despite controlling for the individual’s ideology could 
be the ‘illusion of control’. By this, I mean that I simply have not managed to include 
the right or sufficient variables related to the ideology hypothesis to fully control for 
the individual’s relevant world views in light of the dependent variable. If this is the 
case, the cultural variables may capture the effects of the non-controlled-for aspects 
of the individual’s ideology. It is up to future research to clarify the conceptual 
position of opinions and to merge the welfare state opinion literature with the insights 
from institutionalism. 
In the article dealing with retirement preferences, When do people want to retire? 
The preferred retirement age gap between Eastern and Western Europe explained, 
six cultural variables related to ideas in society about old age and ageism were used 
as control variables, though none affected the dependent variable – which is what we 
could theoretically expect from a pure preference measure. The article assesses to 
what extent job characteristics and the formal retirement age affect retirement 
preferences. The fact that indicators about mental and physical well-being did not 
manage to account for the effect of job characteristics on retirement preferences, 
indeed indicates that retirement is a complex decision in which a multitude of factors 
play a role. One possible explanation could be that individuals in jobs with more 
favourable characteristics identify themselves more strongly with their work, and 
hence would prefer to retire later. 
The article shows that legal retirement ages have an important impact on when 
individuals want to retire. The fact that a lower legal retirement age coincides with 
preferences to retire earlier, makes sense from a rational choice perspective. 
However, no effect of the existence of early retirement schemes on retirement 
preferences was found, while one would expect that to be the case in this approach. 
Based on this finding, it seems reasonable to perceive the effect of the formal 
retirement age rather as the consequence of the fact that a formal retirement age sets 
a norm individuals internalise and feel they should live up to. Increases in the legal 
retirement age are a good opportunity to test the idea that retirement ages turn into 
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norms, as one would expect the norms to adapt to the new retirement age with some 
delay. Unfortunately, too few countries had an increase in their retirement age in the 
years before data collection to find significant results. However, the fact that Swedes 
preferred to retire much earlier than could be expected based on their average 
characteristics, could point in this direction: Sweden was one of the few countries 
which did increase the retirement age in that period. 
After having discussed opinions and preferences, the paper Culture matters: 
Employment, informal eldercare and caregiver burden in Europe discusses actions 
and outcomes. In the paper, I analyse women’s involvement in informal eldercare, 
and how it affects their well-being. There is very little variation between countries in 
terms of giving care: in all countries, around 15-20 per cent of women between 50 
and 65 with at least one living parent or parent-in-law provides care for the latter. 
While the share of family carers is more or less the same in all countries, the amount 
of care they give varies greatly between countries. Not the caregiving itself, but the 
care intensity is dependent on cultural factors: in countries where eldercare is 
considered a family responsibility, caregivers are more involved in high-intensity 
care. Policies are not included in the analyses. Unlike in social security schemes such 
as retirement pensions, where the same rules apply to everyone in the country, lower-
level governments such as municipalities tend to be more involved in welfare services 
such as eldercare in many countries. This makes it very difficult to measure the 
impact of policies on care in international surveys. Also in this study, I find little 
support for rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists would typically expect a 
trade-off between employment and care, which does not appear in the data. 
Employment affects neither caregiving nor care intensity. Unfortunately, information 
about the individual’s mental models and preferences related to employment and 
caregiving are not available in the dataset. 
In the article, I also take the next step and look at outcomes – in this case well-being 
of the caregiver. Outcomes are important as they can be a cause of change in 
institutionalist theory, especially when the outcome of an action is considered as 
undesirable or conflicting with one’s ideas about what is right and what is wrong. 
The analyses show that the impact of caregiving on well-being is highly dependent 
on the cultural setting, and hence likely the consequence of women experiencing 
conflicts between what they perceive as their role and their actions. In countries 
where eldercare is not considered a family responsibility and countries with a high 
female labour market participation rate for the age group in question, I find the lowest 
well-being among women who give intensive care and are not employed, while the 
highest well-being is found among women who are employed – with few differences 
between carers and non-carers. In countries where eldercare is considered a family 
responsibility by a large majority and in countries with low employment rates among 
women between 50 and 65, the lowest well-being is found among non-carers, 
especially when they are not employed. Here, the highest well-being is found among 
women combining both full-time employment and intensive informal caregiving. 
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This evidence supports sociological institutionalist ideas about how individuals can 
experience strain when their actions do not coincide with their internalised norms. 
The final article, Lifecourses, pensions and poverty among elderly women in 
Belgium: Interactions between family history, work history and pension regulations, 
deals with how women’s life courses shape specific outcomes in terms of poverty 
depending on the regulations in place. Belgian pension policy is an exemplary case 
of path dependence, with policy development lagging behind on major societal 
changes taking place in the second half of the 20th Century, primarily in terms of 
family developments. The male breadwinner family remains the cornerstone of the 
pension system, in which women are very well protected against their primary risk 
in a male breadwinner society, namely widowhood. No matter your earlier life course 
and whether or not you have been employed at any time in your life, being a widow 
is sufficient for being protected against poverty after retirement. However, family 
forms not fitting within the male breadwinner model, such as women who never 
married or who are divorced, only yield limited protection – if any at all – and face a 
high risk of ending up in poverty after retirement. Another particularity is that of 
negative derived rights and the family rate: married women with limited pension 
entitlements do not receive their pension benefits, but instead their husbands receive 
a pension at the family rate, compensating them for having a dependent spouse. Such 
an outcome, showing that policies are to a large extent out of sync with society, even 
to such an extent that it pushes large groups of women into poverty after retirement 
as a result of a divorce earlier in life, could be a trigger for policy change. 
Seen from a life course perspective, women have accumulated severe disadvantages 
as a result of their institutionalised life courses. First, in line with the male 
breadwinner model, social time schedules expected them to not be in the labour 
market, or at least retreat from paid employment and focus on the family once they 
marry. As norms changed over time and divorce became an acceptable option, several 
women terminated their marriage. Divorce indeed is a disruptive event in this case, 
as it means losing not only your husband but also the income he brought in before. 
In an attempt to cope with this situation, many divorced women re-entered the labour 
market. However, after retirement, the same divorce leads to a subsequent setback, 
as divorced women only receive limited pension entitlements for the period they were 
married and not employed. At the same time, the former husband does not see his 
pension affected in any way, meaning that the financial risk of the divorce lies fully 
with the dependent spouse – at least as far as retirement pensions are concerned. 
The four articles illustrate the different aspects of the concept of defamilisation, as 
well as its limits. Belgian pension regulations are a case of explicit economic 
familialism, with benefits dependent on your current and past family situation. 
Moreover, by keeping large groups of women in poverty as a result of previous life 
events, the pension system arguably has some traits of implicit familialism as well, 
as these women likely need financial support from the people around them. The paper 
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on eldercare is an example of social familialism and shows the effect of familialist 
norms on women’s behaviour and its consequences, providing evidence of the strong 
cultural impact on the level of familial support. This strengthens my conviction that 
we should conceive familialism and defamilisation in terms of outcomes, accounting 
for both policies and cultural norms, as much of the effect of policies is dependent on 
these norms. Finally, the paper on retirement preferences can illustrate the boundary 
between defamilisation and degenderisation. While most post-communist countries 
still have a gender difference in retirement ages, Western European countries have 
‘degenderised’ their retirement ages and closed the gap between the retirement ages 
for men and women over the years – the United Kingdom being a notable exception. 
Even though this is a clear case of degenderisation, this transition has little to do with 
dependence on the family, which is the core of defamilisation. 
On a final note, I want to suggest a path for further research. This introduction has 
discussed and tried to combine three different traditions in research: institutionalism, 
defamilisation and life courses. A further integration of these three traditions could 
lead to better theoretical and empirical insights into the role policies play in the 
accumulation of disadvantages many women experience throughout the life course. 
Institutionalist theory offers a good framework to link the macro-level policies and 
cultures of the defamilisation literature to concrete life courses at the micro-level. 
Moreover, while most of the literature on defamilisation and gendered life courses 
focuses on women’s lives during active age and its consequences for these women, a 
linked lives approach could include the perspectives of the other individuals in the 
dependency networks, too. This could generate new perspectives on how, under 
which circumstances and for whom certain policies create dependencies on the 
family. 
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